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Summary
In 2011 a comprehensive reform of the Norwegian public pension system was
implemented. A key feature of the new pension scheme is the decoupling of the
decision to retire from the labour force and the decision to claim old age pension
benefits. Agents eligible for early pension take-up can claim pension benefits in
the age range 62 - 75, regardless of whether they retire from the labour force
or not. When a potential claimant delays pension take-up by, say, a year, she
forgoes pension benefits this year - but annual pension benefits for the rest of
her life are increased. The decision to delay claiming can therefore be thought
of as buying an annuity.
Actuarial neutrality of a pension scheme requires that the expected value of
future benefits is the same regardless of the timing of the pension take-up. In
Norway, pensions are actuarially adjusted based on average longevity measures
specific to each birth cohort. Since individual expected longevities may differ
from the average longevity of a birth cohort, there is a potential scope for adverse
selection. Individuals with lower than average expected longevity may increase
their expected lifetime income by claiming as early as possible, while individuals
with higher than average expected longevity may increase their expected lifetime
income by delaying the pension take-up.
When the pension scheme was implemented in 2011, all four combinations of
retirement and claiming turned out to be rather common. Brinch et al. (2013)
find some positive correlation between retirement and the claiming of pension
benefits, but the relationship is far from perfect. In particular, the authors find
that claiming is strongly associated with predictors of expected longevity.
Individuals who retire without claiming pension benefits must rely on pre-
vious savings or some income stream to finance current consumption. Being in
a couple may facilitate this option if agents can rely on the partners’ income
while delaying the pension take-up. This thesis investigates whether empirical
evidence suggests that couples coordinate on claiming pension benefits.
This thesis relates to two strands of the economic literature: the demand for
annuities and economic models of household behaviour. There is no consensus
among economists on the determinants of annuity demand, nor on the extent to
which the household cooperates and pool their resources. The theoretical parts
of the thesis investigate both issues thoroughly.
The starting point for the empirical investigation of couples’ take-up decisions
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are all Norwegian citizens who were born in 1949, members of a couple and
eligible for early pension take-up in 2011. For these individuals I have data on
annual incomes (2010 and 2011), wealth (2010), partner’s income (2010) and
pension take-up. I also have data on the relative money’s worth (RMW) of
delaying pension take-up from age 62 to 67. In their study of adverse selection
in the Norwegian pension scheme, Brinch et al. (2013) estimate a mortality model
and simulate the life span of each individual in the 1949-cohort. The authors
use the expected longevity to calculate the RMW of delaying pension take-up for
each individual who was eligible for early pension take-up in 2011. The RMW
is defined as the lifetime expected benefits conditional on claiming at age 67 in
terms of expected benefits conditional on claiming at age 62.
All regression are done in Stata. The first empirical strategy is to investigate
the decision to retire without claiming pension benefits. First, I estimate a linear
probability model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if the individual retired without claiming pension benefits. I use own
income and wealth, partner’s income and the RMW of delaying pension take-
up as regressors. The only significant regressor is a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual is in the upper quartile of the income distribution in
the sample. Importantly, wealth, partner’s income and the RMW of delaying
pension take-up are not significant. In the second step, I exclude individuals
who did not retire from the sample, and use the same regressors to estimate the
probability of not claiming pension benefits. Three regressors are significant:
a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is in the upper quartile of
the income distribution, a dummy variable indicating whether the individual
is in the upper quartile of the wealth distribution and the RMW of delaying
pension take-up. Partner’s income is not significant. It is tempting to interpret
the estimated result as the probability of not claiming benefits given that an
individual has retired. Since the decision to retire and the decision to claim
pension benefits may be simultaneous decisions, the estimated result should,
however, be interpreted with caution.
The second empirical strategy is to investigate couples where both members
were born in 1949 and eligible for early pension take-up in 2011. First, I esti-
mate a linear probability model on the sample of couples where only one member
claimed benefits, using the difference in RMW as the sole regressor. The differ-
ence in RMW is not significant. Thereafter I estimate the probability of wife
claiming while the husband did not claim, using the RMW of delaying the take-
iv
up of both the wife and the husband as distinct regressors. None of the regressors
are significant, and we would not reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients
are zero. Similarly, I estimate the probability of husband claiming while the
wife did not claim, using the RMW of delaying the take-up of both the wife and
the husband as distinct regressors. In this regression the RMW of delaying the
husband’s take-up is significant.
At last, I investigate whether empirical evidence suggests that individuals
in the sample understand the incentives in the pension scheme. I estimate the
probability of the wife claiming benefits, disregarding the husband’s decision.
I use the RMW of delaying the take-up of both the wife and the husband as
distinct regressors, and find that only the RMW of delaying the wife’s take-
up is significant. I run a similar regression estimating the probability of the
husband claiming pension benefits, regardless of what his wife did, and find that
both regressors were significant. The findings suggest that claiming is strongly
associated with the RMW of delaying pension take-up, and are thus in accordance
with the findings of Brinch et al. (2013).
None of the empirical findings suggest that Norwegian couples coordinate
on claiming pension benefits. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that the
individuals understand and respond to the incentives in the pension scheme.
Lack of coordination should therefore not be interpreted as lack of understanding
of the incentive structure.
v
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1 Introduction
In 2011 a comprehensive reform of the Norwegian public pension system was
implemented, specifying new rules for the accumulation of pension entitlements
as well as for the claiming of old age pension benefits. The new pension scheme
allows individuals to claim pension benefits at any point between age 62 and 75,
regardless of whether he or she retires from the labour force. The new system
allows, in other words, for a decoupling of the timing of retirement from the
labour force and pension take-up. It is therefore useful to explicitly distinguish
between the retirement decision and the pension take-up decision. The former
refers to the decision to leave the labour force while the latter refers to the
decision to claim pension benefits, and is essentially a financial decision.
The decoupling of these decisions yields four possible combinations of retire-
ment and claiming of pension benefits. As an individual turns 62 she may choose
to retire and claim pension benefits, retire and delay pension take-up, not retire
and claim pension benefits, and not retire and delay pension take-up.
When a potential claimant delays pension take-up by, say, a year, she forgoes
pension benefits this year - but annual pension benefits for the rest of her life
are increased. The delay of claiming can therefore be thought of as buying
an annuity, treating the pension benefits forfeited as the price of the annuity.
Actuarial neutrality of a pension scheme requires that the net present value of
future benefits is the same regardless of the timing of the pension take-up. In
Norway, pensions are actuarially adjusted based on average longevity measures
specific to each birth cohort. Since individual expected longevities may differ
from the average longevity of a birth cohort, there is a potential scope for adverse
selection. Individuals with lower than average expected longevity may increase
their lifetime pension income by claiming as early as possible, while the opposite
holds for individuals with higher than average expected longevity.
The findings of Brinch et al. (2013) suggest that there is substantial adverse
selection with regard to the claiming of pension benefits in the new Norwegian
pension scheme. The authors find some positive correlation between retirement
and the claiming of old age pensions, but the relationship is far from perfect
and all four combinations of retirement and claiming are rather common. This
means that many individuals claim pension benefits without retiring and that
many individuals retire without claiming old-age pension benefits. The decision
to retire from the labour force and the decision to claim pension benefits are
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clearly decoupled for a significant number of individuals, and Brinch et al. (2013)
find that claiming is strongly associated with predictors of expected longevity.
In this thesis I will investigate whether empirical evidence suggests that Nor-
wegian couples coordinate on claiming pension benefits. Individuals who retire
without claiming pension benefits need to rely on previous savings or some in-
come stream to finance current consumption. Being in a couple may facilitate
this option if an agent can rely on the partner’s income while delaying the take-
up. Economic models of the household differ, however, in their predictions of
economic cooperation and household money management.
The topic of this thesis relates to two strands of economic theory. Since
delaying the take-up of pension benefits is equivalent to buying an annuity, the
take-up decision can be analyzed in the theoretical framework normally used to
study the demand for annuities. The second component of the the theoretical
framework is economic models of household behaviour.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief
overview of the new Norwegian pension scheme, as well as an explanation of how
the pension scheme is actuarial neutral on average. Emphasis is also put on how
expected longevity at the moment of take-up determines annual pension benefits.
Chapter 3 discusses the demand for annuities. The first section explains what
annuities are and how their money’s worth is calculated. The second section
discusses several determinants of annuity demand, while the third section stresses
problems of asymmetric information, and adverse selection in particular. Lastly,
I will refer to some empirical findings on adverse selection in annuity markets.
In chapter 4 I complete the theoretical framework of the thesis by introducing
four economic models of household behaviour. The second section emphasizes
the distinction between private and public goods in the household, while three
broad types of preferences and their properties are presented in the third sec-
tion. Basically, there are four broad options for modelling household behaviour:
the unitary approach, non-cooperative models, collective models and bargaining
models (Browning and Lechene, 2001). In the fourth section I present models
of household behaviour from each strand, and discuss their predictions with re-
gard to couples’ pension take-up. The fifth section provides an overview of some
empirical findings to which this thesis relates.
All regressions are done in Stata, and the empirical results are reported in
chapter 5. The first section of the chapter provides a description of the data
set that I will use for the empirical analysis: all Norwegian citizens who became
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eligible for early pension take-up in 2011 by turning 62 years. I will also explain
how Brinch et al. (2013) estimate expected longevities for the Norwegian cohort
of 1949 within the framework of the microsimulation model MOSART, and how
the authors use these estimates to calculate the relative money’s worth (RMW)
of delaying pension take-up from age 62 to 67 for each individual. The first
empirical strategy is to investigate how own income and wealth, the RMW of
delaying pension take-up and partner’s income can explain the choice to retire
without claiming pension benefits. The second section of the chapter describes
this empirical strategy, reports the regression results and discusses the findings.
The second empirical strategy is to investigate the pension take-up by couples
where both members were born in 1949 and were eligible for pension take-up
in 2011. I use the RMWs of delaying pension take-up of both members in two
different ways to estimate the probability of only one member claiming benefits.
The third section describes the second empirical strategy, reports the regres-
sion results and discusses the findings. As last, I investigate whether empirical
evidence suggests that the individuals in the sample understand the incentive
structure in the pension scheme and behave in accordance with the findings of
Brinch et al. (2013).
Chapter 6 concludes.
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2 The Norwegian Pension Scheme
The aim of this chapter is to describe the pension scheme that was implemented
in Norway in January 2011. A key feature of the new pension scheme is flexible
retirement for the age group 62 - 75 years. Flexible retirement rules imply that
the decision to retire from the labour force and the decision to claim old age
pension benefits are in principle decoupled. In particular, the latter decision is
essentially a purely financial decision.
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section provides a brief overview
of the rules for accumulation of pension entitlements as well as the rules for
pension take-up. I will describe both the post-reform rules for the accumulation
of pension entitlements as well as the pre-reform rules.1 In the second section I
will explain the concept of actuarial neutrality and how the Norwegian pension
scheme is actuarial neutral on average. I will also explain how life expectancy
at the moment of pension take-up is an important determinant of the level of
annual pension benefits. In the third section I will briefly describe contractual
pensions in the private and public sector, as well as spouse benefits and surviving
spouse benefits.
2.1 The Norwegian Pension System
The Accumulation of Pension Entitlements
The new pension scheme consists of an income pension and a guarantee pension
for people with no or only a small income pension.
With regard to the income pension the notion of pension wealth is an impor-
tant feature. At any point in time, a person’s pension wealth is the sum of the
pension entitlements that he or she has accumulated.2
A feature of the new Norwegian pension scheme is that all income made
from the age of 13 until the age of 75 increases pension wealth. This means
that all years with income count equally, and it is referred to as ”the all-years-
rule”. There is an upper bound to an individual’s yearly accumulation of pension
1In the empirical part of this thesis I will use data on the Norwegian 1949-cohort. Since
these individuals have accumulated their pension entitlements according to the pre-reform
rules, I found it useful to describe these rules as well.
2The Norwegian pension system is a ”pay as you go” system, and the pension wealth is
only a fictitious or virtual capital account.
4
entitlements, corresponding to 18.1% of 7.1 basic amounts.3 Pension entitlements
are accumulated through income from work, but also through serving compulsory
military service, receiving unemployment or sick leave benefits or doing unpaid
care work. Throughout the contribution period there is full wage indexation,
which means that the pension wealth is adjusted in line with the economy-wide
wage growth every year until the pension benefits are claimed.4
The pension benefits in the previous pension scheme were based on a two-
tier system: a basic pension and a supplementary pension. A person’s basic
pension was determined by the length of the membership in the National Insur-
ance Scheme, and was approximately equal to the basic amount. If a person was
married or living as a cohabitant, the partner’s income status would also deter-
mine the basic pension. The supplementary pension was, on the other hand,
dependent on earnings over the life-cycle.5 Individuals accumulated ”pension
points” in the age range of 17 - 69, and full supplementary pensions were earned
after 40 years (”the 40 years rules”). The main determinant of the supplemen-
tary pension was an adjusted average point score, which was calculated on the
basis of the individual’s 20 best years, i.e. the 20 years where income was highest
relative to the basic amount.
The new rules for accumulation of pension entitlements are binding for all
cohorts born after 1963. For cohorts born in the period 1954 - 1962 the new
rules for accumulation of pension entitlements are combined with the old rules.
For cohorts born before 1953 pension entitlements are accumulated as specified
by the old pension scheme.
Flexible Retirement Age and Take-Up Rules
Until 2011, old age pensions benefits from the National Insurance Scheme could
be claimed only as a person turned 67. The new pension scheme, however, allows
an individual to claim old age pension benefits at any point between age 62 and
75, regardless of whether he retires from the labour force or not. This makes it
necessary to distinguish between the decision to retire from the labour force and
the decision to claim old-age pension benefits. I will refer to the former as the
retirement decision and to the latter as the take-up decision.
3The basic amount (G) was in May 2012 specified such that 1 G = 82 122 NOK, and 7.1
G = 583 066 NOK.
4For further details see Arbeidsdepartementet (2009).
5Persons with very low earnings got a special supplementary pension, such that minimum
pension = basic pension + special supplementary pension.
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A person can also choose whether to draw the entire pension or only a fraction
of it.6 There is no means testing, which means that the pension income is
neutral towards other income streams. In this way, the new rules facilitate the
combination of pension and labour income, and an individual can work as much
as he wants without his pension benefits being reduced. If an individual does
not retire from the labour force as he decides to claim his pension benefits, he
will continue to earn pension entitlements.
In Norway, pension benefits are paid until a person deceases. By delaying the
take-up of pension benefits, the annual payments that an agent receive for the
rest of his life will increase. Depending on expected longevity, there may thus be
substantial gains to delaying the old age pension benefits. This possibility will
thoroughly be explored below.
Not everyone is eligible to claim old age benefits before the age of 67. In
order to be eligible, the accumulated pension entitlements must be sufficiently
high. More precisely, for an individual to be eligible for early pension take-up, his
accumulated pension wealth must be high enough to ensure that he will, at the
age of 67, receive yearly pension benefits equal to or greater than the minimum
pension.7
2.2 The Notion of Actuarial Neutrality
The notion of actuarial neutrality is an important feature of the new Norwegian
pension scheme. In this section I will explain the meaning of actuarial neutrality
and how the Norwegian pension system is actuarial neutral on average. I will
thereafter explain how a life expectancy adjustment ratio is used to adjust annual
pensions.
The Actuarial Neutrality of the Norwegian Pension Scheme
In many countries the decision to retire from the labour force and the decision to
claim old age pension benefits are essentially the same decision. These decisions
6The fractions among which an individual can choose are 20%, 40%, 50%, 60%, and 80%.
7If the yearly pension benefits and the minimum pension level were regulated according
to the same principles, a necessary and sufficient condition would be that the yearly pension
benefits at the moment of the claiming were tangent to the minimum pension level. The
regulation of yearly pension benefits is, however, different than the regulation of the minimum
pension. As a consequence, the yearly pension benefits at the moment of claiming must be
strictly greater than the minimum pension level for 67 year-olds at the moment of claiming.
For further details see Arbeids- og velferdsdirektoratet (2011).
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are decoupled in Norway, and the latter is essentially a financial decision. Actu-
arial neutrality of the Norwegian pension scheme means that for a given pension
wealth, the net present discounted value of future benefits is independent of the
timing of pension take-up (Jousten, 2007; Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006).
The notion of actuarial neutrality can be illustrated by the following example.
An individual who is eligible to claim old age pension benefits when she turns
62 faces the following trade-off: she may claim her benefits now, or she may
delay claiming by, say, a year. The delay of claiming will increase her annual
payments for the rest of her life. The Norwegian pension scheme is actuarial
neutral on average, meaning that for a person with average expected longevity,
the reduction in annual pension benefits due to early claiming exactly offsets the
longer period for which they will be received.
For agents whose life expectancy differs from the average, the expected dis-
counted value of future pension benefits depends on the timing of the pension
take-up. An agent with higher than average life expectancy, for example, will
receive pension benefits for an extended period of time. This makes the in-
crease in annual pension benefits by delaying more valuable in terms of expected
discounted value of future benefits.
It is not unproblematic to claim that the Norwegian pension scheme is ac-
tuarial neutral on average. There are some practical concerns that may conflict
with the pure neutrality of the take-up decision with respect to age. The as-
sumptions about the discount rate and survival rate, for example, may not hold.
Another concern is that the neutrality is defined in terms of the gross level of
pensions. Pension benefits are subject to taxation, and taxation is implemented
at an annual level and is progressive. Although the system is notionally neutral,
the actual system is therefore not really neutral (Indahl, 2012).
Actuarial Neutrality and Actuarial Fairness
Sometimes the terminology causes confusion, and economists and politicians use
the term actuarial neutrality as a substitute for actuarial fairness. Actuarial
fairness and actuarial neutrality are, however, two distinct concepts. A system
is actuarial fair if the expected present value of benefits net of contributions over
the entire life-cycle equals zero. A pension scheme that is actuarially neutral is
not necessarily actuarially fair (Jousten, 2007). A feature that these two con-
cepts have in common, is that they only make sense ex ante. Ex-post outcomes
will differ because the calculation of the expected present value of accrued pen-
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sion benefits is based on probabilities, but in reality people die at different ages
(Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006).
Annual Benefits and the Life Expectancy Adjustment Ratio
There are two determinants of the size of an individual’s annual pension benefits:
the individual’s pension wealth and life expectancy at the moment of take-up.
The adjustment ratio reflects the life expectancy, or the expected period of ac-
crued pension benefits, at the moment of take up.8 At the moment of take-up,
annual pension benefits are calculated as the ratio of accumulated pension wealth
to the expected longevity.
As a cohort turns 61, a set of adjustment ratios are calculated. The adjust-
ment ratios reflect average expected longevity at different points in time for that
specific cohort.9 Examples of adjustment ratios are given in table 1.
Table 1: Forecast of adjustment ratios for cohorts born in 1954 - 1994 (Arbeids-
og velferdsdirektoratet, 2013a).
Cohort
Age 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
62 19.01 19.48 20.00 20.53 21.06 21.60 22.13 22.67 23.20
63 18.19 18.67 19.18 19.71 20.25 20.78 21.32 21.85 22.38
64 17.38 17.85 18.37 18.90 19.43 19.96 20.50 21.04 21.57
65 16.57 17.04 17.55 18.08 18.61 19.14 19.68 20.22 20.75
66 15.76 16.23 16.74 17.26 17.79 18.32 18.86 19.39 19.93
67 14.96 15.42 15.96 16.45 16.97 17.50 18.04 18.57 19.10
68 14.16 14.62 15.12 15.63 16.15 16.68 17.22 17.75 18.28
69 13.37 13.82 14.38 14.89 15.41 15.93 16.39 16.92 17.45
70 12.59 13.02 13.51 14.02 14.53 15.05 15.57 16.10 16.62
71 11.81 12.23 12.72 13.21 13.72 14.24 14.76 15.28 15.80
72 11.04 11.46 11.93 12.42 12.92 13.43 13.94 14.46 14.97
73 10.28 10.69 11.15 11.63 12.12 12.62 13.13 13.64 14.15
74 9.54 9.93 10.38 10.85 11.34 11.83 12.33 12.83 13.33
75 8.81 9.19 9.63 10.09 10.56 11.04 11.53 12.02 12.52
The introduction of life expectancy adjustment ratios in the Norwegian pen-
8The life expectancy adjustment ratio refers to a concept which is called delingstall or
forholdstall in Norwegian. Both delingstall and forholdstall reflect life expectancy at the mo-
ment of take-up, but are calculated in different ways. Delingstall applies to the cohorts born
after 1963, while forholdstall applies to 1943 - 1953 cohorts. For the cohorts born in 1954 -
1962 a combination of forholdstall and delingstall apply. For further details see Arbeids- og
velferdsdirektoratet (2013a)
9More specifically, monthly adjustment ratios reflecting life expectancy in the age range 62
- 75 are calculated for each cohort.
8
sion scheme serves two main purposes. First, the use of life expectancy adjust-
ment ratios makes the pension scheme actuarially neutral on average. Secondly,
the introduction of life expectancy adjustment ratios serves to achieve financial
sustainability in the longer run: when longevity increases, the pension levels will
automatically be lower.
2.3 Other Pensions
Contractual Pensions in the Private and Public Sector (AFP)
The AFP scheme is a pension scheme for employees who have reached the age
of 62 and work in an area that has a collective agreement concerning contrac-
tual early retirement. There are different rules for private and public sector
contractual retirement pension schemes.
A private sector contractual early retirement pension is a lifelong supplement
to the national insurance retirement pension. As an agent starts drawing his
private sector contractual early retirement pension, he must also apply for the
national insurance retirement pension at the same time. There is no earnings
testing, meaning that the agent can work as much as he likes without the pension
being reduced.
In the public sector, on the other hand, a contractual early retirement pension
is an early retirement pension that can be received in the age range 62 - 67. It
is not possible to receive public sector contractual early retirement pension and
pension from the National Insurance Scheme at the same time. There are also
restrictions on how much a person can earn without his public sector contractual
early retirement pension being reduced.
Spouse Supplement
Old-age pensioners who have turned 67 and receive a full pension may receive
a spouse supplement. A spouse supplement can also be granted for cohabiting
partners if the couple have children together or have been married in the past.
To receive a spouse supplement it is required that the spouse does not receive
a national insurance pension, is not entitled to a full national insurance retire-
ment pension, and does not have an income that exceeds the basic amount. A
spouse supplement can not be granted if the spouse receives either a contractual
private sector pension that was granted before 1 January 2011 or a contractual
public sector pension.
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Benefits for Surviving Spouse
Survivor’s pension is intended to ensure subsistence income for a surviving spouse,
registered partner, or cohabitor following the death of the other party.10 The
pension ceases if the surviving spouse marries again or has children with a new
cohabitor. Survivor’s pension also ceases if a person takes out contractual pen-
sion (AFP). The pension will be converted to disability pension if the surviving
party is entitled to disability pension and to retirement pension at the age of 67.
Pension and transitional benefit consist of basic pension, supplementary pen-
sion, and/or special supplement. The surviving spouse receives full basic pension
if the deceased lived in Norway for 40 years.11 Supplementary pension is calcu-
lated on the spouse’s previous employment income and how many years he or
she received employment income. Supplementary pension amount to 55 % of
the supplementary pension the deceased would have received if he or she had
entitlement to disability pension or retirement pension at the time of death.
The survivor’s pension is means-tested and will be reduced if the surviving
spouse has or can be expected to have his or her own employment income.
10A surviving spouse is entitled to survivor’s pension if he or she was married to the deceased
for at least 5 years or had a child with the deceased. A person may also be entitled to survivor’s
pension if he or she has custody of the child of the deceased. A surviving registered partner is
entitled to benefits on the same terms and conditions as surviving spouses. The same applies to
a surviving cohabitant if he or she had a child with the deceased cohabitant or had previously
been married to the deceased cohabitant. For further details on the requirements for being
entitled to survivor’s benefits see Arbeids- og velferdsdirektoratet (2013b).
11Full basic pension is normally equivalent to the basic among (G).
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3 The Demand for Annuities
A life annuity is a contract that pays a certain return per period to a beneficiary,
the annuitant, for as long as the annuitant is alive. In Norway, a pension is a
stream of benefits that is paid until the beneficiary deceases. In this context, a
pension is an annuity insuring against the risk of outliving one’s resources.
The decoupling of the decision to retire and the decision to claim old age
pension benefits makes the latter essentially a financial decision. If an agent
delays claiming by, say, a year, he increases the yearly future pension benefits
through the actuarial adjustment, but forgoes pension benefits this year. The
decision to delay claiming can therefore be thought of as buying an additional
annuity, treating the money forfeited this year as the price of the annuity (Brinch
et al., 2013). The take-up decision of old age pension benefits can therefore be
analyzed in the theoretical framework normally used to study the demand for
annuities. This approach has also been used by Brinch et al. (2013), Hurd et al.
(2004) and Coile et al. (2002).
The aim of this chapter is to discuss some determinants of annuity demand. I
will also discuss how problems of asymmetric information may lead to problems
of moral hazard and adverse selection in the market for annuities. The chapter
is organized as follows: in the first section I will explain what annuities are, how
their money’s worth is calculated and the presence of implicit annuities in the
Norwegian pension scheme. The second part of the chapter provides an overview
of some determinants of annuity demand. Finally, in the last section, I will
explain how the market for annuities potentially is exposed to problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection.
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3.1 Annuities
An annuity is a financial product that entitles the holder to a pre-specified
amount per period (e.g., every month) for as long as the annuitant is alive.
Uncertain life length poses a problem of how to allocate lifetime resources when
agents have no access to insurance markets. On the one hand, if they consume too
conservatively, they may leave substantial unintended bequests. On the other,
if they consume without caution, they run the risk of outliving their resources.
Annuities provide insurance against the latter scenario (Sheshinski, 2008: 1-2).
The original meaning of ”annuity” was an asset that paid an annual income
without payments necessarily tied to an individual or group of individuals being
alive. Traditionally, the term life annuity was used for an asset with life con-
tingent payments to distinguish it from a term-certain annuity. A term-certain
annuity is a stream of payments made for a maximum number of years, indepen-
dently of survival, and is conceptually similar to conventional bonds (Cannon
and Tonks, 2008: 18).
Cannon and Tonks (2008) distinguish between three generic types of single-
life annuity. A conventional annuity pays the holder an income each period until
the annuitant deceases in return for a lump sum (or premium) paid in advance.
This annuity provides insurance against the risk of a long life. A temporary
annuity is a stream of payments paid while the annuitant is alive, but with a
maximum number of payments. The payment ceases either when the holder of
the annuity deceases or when the maximum is reached: whichever happens first.
A deferred annuity is a stream of payments beginning at some point in the future
and made conditional on the annuitant being alive. With this type of annuity it
is possible that no payments will ever be made.12
The Money’s Worth of an Annuity
The most common way to compare the value of annuities with other assets is
by using a measure called money’s worth. The money’s worth of an annuity is
the ratio of the expected annuity payments to the price. The randomness in the
income stream stems from stochastic life length. When the money’s worth of
an annuity is 1, the annuity is perfectly fairly priced in actuarial terms (Cannon
and Tonks, 2008: 117-118).
12Chapter 2 in Cannon and Tonks (2008) provides a more detailed discussion of annuity
product types.
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The money’s worth of an annuity bought at time 0 is the expected present
value of the income stream divided by the price of the annuity, and is given by:
MW =
1
P
E
( ∞∑
t=1
st
(1 + r)t
At
)
(1)
where P is the price of the annuity, st is the probability of surviving year t, r is
the real interest rate and At is the annuity rate.
The money’s worth of an annuity is increasing in the probability of surviving
and decreasing in the interest rate. The first observation follows since an increase
in the probability of survival implies that the expected time interval of annuity
payout increases as well. The second observation follows since the net present
value of an income stream is reduced when the discount factor increases. Another
way to think of this, is that when the return on alternative investments increases,
the opportunity cost of holding an annuity increases as well (Hurd et al., 2004).
Implicit Annuities in the Norwegian Pension Scheme
The main purpose of an annuity is to insure against the risk of outliving one’s
resources. All participants in the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme are pro-
vided with a guarantee or minimum pension. This means that all participants
are provided with an annuity and are partially isolated against this risk of out-
living their resources. The take-up decision can, however, be studied within the
framework normally used to study the demand for annuities. The decision to
delay claiming can be thought of as buying an additional annuity, treating the
money forfeited this year as the price of the annuity. In this context, the indi-
vidual faces a menu of different annuities which are characterized by an agent’s
age at pension take-up (Brinch et al., 2013).
Let Ana denote the income stream at age a conditional on claiming pensions
at age n = 62, 63, ..., 75, for a given pension wealth. Delaying the claiming of old
age benefits from age 62 to 67 is equivalent to buying a deferred annuity. The
money’s worth of this annuity is:
MW =
E
(∑∞
a=67
sa
(1+r)a−62A
67
a
)
− E
(∑∞
a=67
sa
(1+r)a−62A
62
a
)
E
(∑66
a=62
sa
(1+r)a−62A
62
a
) (2)
The numerator is the expected change in the stream of pension benefits by de-
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laying the claiming of pension benefits from age 62 to 67. The denominator is
the expected price, or the pension benefits forfeited, by delaying claiming from
age 62 to 67. Note that the price is also a random variable, since an individual
may decease before the pensions from age 62 to 66 are forfeited.
Actuarial neutrality requires that MW = 1. When this condition holds there
are no gains by delaying the pension take-up decision. If MW > 1, delaying
the take-up of pension benefits increases the expected lifetime income stream.
MW > 1 if and only if
E
( ∞∑
a=67
sa
(1 + r)a−62
A67a
)
−E
( ∞∑
a=67
sa
(1 + r)a−62
A62a
)
> E
(
66∑
a=62
sa
(1 + r)a−62
A62a
)
This is equivalent to:
E
( ∞∑
a=67
sa
(1 + r)a−62
A67a
)
> E
( ∞∑
a=62
sa
(1 + r)a−62
A62a
)
14
3.2 Determinants of the Demand for Annuities
Theoretical research on annuities begins with Yaari (1965) and suggests there
are substantial utility gains from annuitisation when the length of life is uncer-
tain. According to Yaari (1965), risk-averse agents would be better off holding
only annuitized assets in the absence of a bequest motive, or a portfolio of annu-
itized and traditional assets in the presence of a bequest motive. An important
assumption in Yaari’s contribution is that the annuity market is actuarially fair.
Although economic theory predicts substantial gains in utility from annuiti-
zation, people buy few annuities in practice. This empirical evidence is often
referred to as the ”annuity puzzle” (Cannon and Tonks, 2008: 180). The litera-
ture seeking to explain the puzzle has identified several factors that may reduce
the demand for annuities. In this section some of these factors will be discussed.
Much of the literature on the annuity puzzle questions the assumption that
annuity markets are actuarially fair. This possibility will be discussed thoroughly
in the next section. For now, I will assume that there exists an actuarially fair
market for annuities. Since participants of the Norwegian National Insurance
Scheme have access to a market of implicit annuities that on average is actuarially
neutral, this is a useful approach.
The aim of this section is to discuss determinants of the demand for annu-
ities within the life-cycle framework. The life-cycle framework is the standard
approach that economists use to analyze the intertemporal allocation of time, ef-
fort and money. In its most general form, the life-cycle model asserts that agents,
throughout their lives, use currently available information and make sequential
decisions to achieve a coherent goal (Browning and Crossley, 2001). Browning
and Crossley (2001) emphasize the distinction between the life-cycle framework
and particular life-cycle models with empirical content. The life-cycle framework,
the authors argue, should be thought of as a conceptual framework within which
we can develop useful models, not as one model in particular.
I have chosen to give a verbal exposition of annuity demand within the life-
cycle framework instead of modelling it explicitly. The reason is the complexity
of this thesis’ topic, which none of the existing models for annuity demand cap-
tures in its entirety. This thesis relates to two strands of economic theory: the
demand for annuities and economic models of household behaviour. Among
economists there is, however, no consensus on how the demand for annuity is
determined nor on the degree of cooperation in the household. Considering the
scope of my thesis, the investigation of whether Norwegian couples coordinate on
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claiming pension benefits, a useful approach is therefore, in my opinion, to first
discuss determinants of annuity demand and thereafter some economic models
of household behaviour.
Two factors, in particular, are important determinants of annuity demand.
The first factor is the money’s worth of the annuity. There may be substantial
economic gains from buying an annuity whenever the money’s worth of the an-
nuity is higher than unity. The second factor is the agent’s risk-aversion. Since
annuities provide insurance they have a value above the simple money’s worth
to risk-averse agents. I will first explain how these two factors influence annu-
ity demand, and subsequently discuss the importance of other factors, including
pre-annuitized wealth, credit markets and liquidity constraints, the subjective
discount rate, marital status and bequest motives. In the exposition I will also
explain how the analysis translates in the context of the Norwegian pension
scheme.
Financial Maximization
Financial maximization suggests that an agent will buy an annuity if its expected
income stream is greater than its cost or initial premium. In this case the money’s
worth of the annuity is above unity. Since the money’s worth of an annuity is
increasing in the survival rate, this means that the money’s worth of an annuity
is relatively higher for people who expect to live longer. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that a person’s expected longevity is an important determinant of his
or her annuity demand.
It is the agent’s personal beliefs about his or her own expected longevity
that is important with regard to annuity demand. I will refer to the agent’s
beliefs about expected longevity as the subjective expected longevity or sub-
jective survival probability. The objective life expectancy, on the other hand,
is a calculation taking into account actual mortality rates and an individual’s
characteristics.
With regard to the Norwegian pension scheme, this means that the expected
monetary value of delaying the take-up of pension benefits is higher for persons
with longer than average expected longevity.
The money’s worth, or similar measures, are commonly used in empirical
research on annuity markets.13 This framework captures one important feature:
when the money’s worth of an annuity is above unity, buying the annuity in-
13See for example Coile et al. (2002), Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) and Hurd et al. (2004).
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creases the agent’s expected lifetime income. Higher expected lifetime income
translates into greater consumption possibilities and increases in this way ex-
pected lifetime utility.
Risk Aversion
The money’s worth of an annuity is simply the ratio of the expected present
value of the income stream to the price of the annuity. It does not include other
characteristics that may alter the value to annuitants. The most important char-
acteristic that raises the value of annuities above the money’s worth calculation,
is the insurance they provide.
With regard to attitudes towards risk, agents may be divided into three cate-
gories: risk neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving. Varian (1992) uses the following
example to illustrate the three attitudes towards risk: Suppose that a consumer
currently has $ 10 of wealth and is contemplating a gamble that gives him a 50
percent probability of winning $ 5 and a 50 percent probability of losing $ 5. His
wealth will therefore be random with an expected value of $ 10.
A risk neutral agent does not care about the riskiness of his wealth at all -
only about its expected value. In this case the expected utility of wealth is the
same as the utility of its expected value. For a risk-averse agent the utility of
the expected value of wealth is greater than the expected utility of wealth. In
other words, a risk-averse agent prefers to have the expected value of his wealth
rather than facing the gamble. For a risk-loving agent the expected utility of
wealth is greater than the utility of the expected value of wealth. Put differently,
a risk-loving agent prefers to face the gamble rather than receiving the expected
value of his wealth.
Since annuities provide insurance against the risk of outliving one’s resources
they have a value that is greater than the simple money’s worth calculation
for risk-averse agents. Let us disregard bequest motives and assume that the
money’s worth of an annuity is unity. When the money’s worth of the annuity is
unity, the expected income stream provided by the annuity is equal to the price
of the annuity. A risk neutral agent is indifferent between buying the annuity
or not. A risk-averse agent, on the other hand, will be strictly better off buying
the annuity. An increase in the coefficient of risk-aversion should therefore lead
to an increase in the demand for annuities.
In reality, and as emphasized by Sass et al. (2007), individuals who postpone
the claiming of pension benefits acquire additional amounts of longevity insur-
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ance. They do this on terms that are actuarially fair. In the context of the
Norwegian pension scheme we would therefore expect more risk-averse individ-
uals to be more prone to delay the pension take-up, if they consider the risk of
outliving their resources a relevant risk. This is because more risk aversion leads
to a higher valuation of the annuity value of delay (Coile et al., 2002).
Pre-Annuitized Wealth
An annuity ensures that an individual’s consumption never falls below the value
of the annuity. This is the primary insurance value associated with annuitization
(Brown, 2001). Since the utility function is assumed to be concave in consump-
tion, this means that the first units of insurance are the most valuable. If an
agent has no annuitized wealth purchasing an annuity will be quite valuable
because it provides a minimum floor below which consumption will never fall.
As more resources are annuitized, the floor rises and additional annuitization is
valued less (Brown, 2001).
According to the literature seeking to explain the annuity puzzle, the level
of pre-annuitized wealth may therefore play an important role in reducing the
demand for annuities. Dushi and Webb (2004), for example, argue that U.S.
citizens have a substantial fraction of annuities in their portfolio provided by
Social Security, and identify this is a major determinant of the annuity puzzle.
All participants of the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme are provided
with some insurance against longevity risk since they are guaranteed a minimum
pension. Delaying the pension take-up is equivalent to buying an additional
annuity. The insurance value of this additional unit of insurance may, however,
be valued less since the agents already are provided with some insurance.
Credit Markets and Liquidity Constraints
Annuities pay off over a long period of time and often involve a big upfront invest-
ment. An agent who is concerned with maximizing lifetime income would buy an
annuity if the expected income stream provided by the annuity is greater than its
cost or initial premium. If the agent’s accumulated wealth is not sufficiently high
he may need to borrow money in order to pay the initial premium. Agents may,
however, be liquidity constrained. Liquidity constraints may exist due to lack of
collateral, enforcement problems, limited liability, adverse selection, asymmetric
information or other imperfections in the capital market.14
14See for example Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) for a thorough discussion of credit rationing.
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In Norway the flexible retirement rules make it possible to retire from the
labour force without claiming old age pension benefits. An agent who retires from
the labour force and delays the pension take-up must, however, finance current
consumption. If capital markets were perfect, the agent would be able to borrow
money today and repay later. If on the other hand borrowing opportunities are
limited, an individual who has retired from the labour force must rely on previous
savings or some income stream in order to delay pension take-up. In the absence
of borrowing possibilities, an agent may therefore choose to claim his pension
benefits as he retires in order to finance current consumption, even though he
would get a greater expected lifetime income by delaying the take-up.
The Subjective Discount Factor
A subjective discount factor is normally used when modelling lifetime utility.
The subjective discount factor measures the extent to which an agent values
future consumption relative to current consumption. It is thus a measure of how
patient the agent is. The subjective discount factor is a preference parameter,
and need not be related to the market discount factor (Romer, 2006).15
This suggests that if agents have strong preferences for current consumption
and already have some pre-annuitized wealth, they may have less incentives to
annuitize additional resources. In the following, I will assume that agents have
a sufficiently high level of pre-annuitized wealth and are not concerned with the
insurance value provided by the annuity. I will also disregard the bequest motive.
It is clear that if the agent is not concerned with the insurance value associated
with annuitization, he will not buy the annuity if its money’s worth is less than
unity. If the money’s worth exceeds unity, buying the annuity increases expected
lifetime income. The agent, however, pays a price today and receives a stream
of income in the future. The question remains whether an impatient consumer
will buy the annuity.
Assuming that capital markets are perfect, the answer is that an impatient
consumer may still want to purchase the annuity. The reason is that buying the
annuity increases expected lifetime income, and in the presence of perfect capital
markets the agent can easily move consumption from one period to another.
Since utility is assumed to be increasing in consumption, the agent will be better
off when the expected lifetime income increases.
If agents have strong preferences for consumption when they are relatively
15The market discount factor is simply 11+r , where r is the market interest rate.
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young and healthy, they may have incentives to claim their old-age pension bene-
fits early in order to tilt the consumption path in favour of current consumption,
even though this reduces expected lifetime income. This is true if for example
the subjective discount factor is high and borrowing possibilities are limited.
Marital Status
The institution of the family provides agents with risk-sharing opportunities.
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) investigate family provision of insurance against
the risk of running out of consumption resources because of greater than av-
erage longevity. The authors investigate the demand for individual annuities
by married rather than single persons, and show that even small families may
significantly improve the family members’ well-being by sharing longevity risk.
In the case of marriage, Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) argue, both individuals
commonly agree to pool their resources while they are alive and to name each
other as the major beneficiary in their wills. In this way, the risk of living too
long is somewhat hedged by the other partner’s potential death. Since couples
may pool mortality risk, the insurance value of annuities is reduced, and they
should therefore value annuities less than single individuals. There may also
be implicit agreements between children and their parents: children provides
for their parents if they live longer than expected and outlive their resources.
Conversely, if the parents die sooner than expected, the children receive the
unspent resources through a bequest.
All participants in the National Insurance Scheme are provided with some
insurance against longevity risk since they receive at least the minimum pen-
sion. Delaying pension benefits provides the agent with additional insurance,
but may also increase expected lifetime income. This may in itself be an argu-
ment in favour of delaying pension take-up. Marital status may influence the
take-up decision in another way than in more traditional annuity demand the-
ory, which emphasizes the insurance aspect. Being in a couple may for example
facilitate delays in pension take-up if there is economic cooperation and pooling
of resources.
Bequest Motives
Introducing bequest motives, i.e. valuing the prospect of leaving wealth to family,
friends or other good causes, complicates the analysis of the demand for annuities.
Annuities entitle a person to a stream of payments in exchange of an initial
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premium. When the annuitant deceases, the income stream ceases. According
to Yaari (1965), risk-averse agents should hold a portfolio of annuitized and
traditional assets in the presence of a bequest motive. The idea that bequest
motives reduce optimal annuitization has considerable intuitive appeal: the single
unavoidable cost of purchasing annuities is the foregone opportunity to bequeath
that wealth (Lockwood, 2012).
According to Davidoff et al. (2005) agents with a bequest motive and access to
an actuarially neutral annuity market should annuitize enough wealth to cover
their planned future consumption. If the agents’ pre-existing annuity income
covers their desired consumption they should not annuitize any wealth.
Introducing bequest motives complicate the analysis in another dimension
as well since they significantly reduce the cost of bearing lifespan risk. With a
bequest motive agents are provided with a new means to insure against longer-
than-expected longevity. Coile et al. (2002) argue that for individuals for whom
a linear bequest motive is operative on the margin, there is no valuation of the
annuity aspect, i.e., of the insurance value, of pension benefits. Consumption
is never reduced to just pension benefits and the bequethable wealth provides
length-of-life insurance.16
The empirical findings of Bernheim (1991) indicate that a significant fraction
of total saving in the U.S. is motivated solely by the desire to leave bequests. In
particular, Bernheim finds that Social Security benefits significantly depress pri-
vate annuity holdings among elderly individuals, indicating that a typical house-
hold would choose to maintain a positive fraction of its resources in bequethable
forms.
With regard to the Norwegian pension scheme, pension benefits can not be
bequeathed. Sass et al. (2007) argue that agents can satisfy their bequest motive
by setting aside the amount they wish to bequeath. They argue further that few
households are likely to have a bequest motive that they cannot satisfy out of
non-Social Security wealth.
16A linear bequest motive implies that the marginal utility of bequests is constant.
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3.3 Asymmetric Information and Annuity Markets
As an insurance product, the market for annuities is potentially exposed to prob-
lems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Problems of moral hazard may arise
if annuitants invest additional resources to raise survival probabilities than they
would have done in the absence of the annuity. In the context of annuitites,
adverse selection means that people who expect to live longer are likely to have
a higher demand for annuities, since they are worth more to them.
Studying the empirical importance of adverse selection and moral hazard is
challenging, especially since it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the
two phenomena, as emphasized by Chiappori and Salanie (2000).
Problems of Moral Hazard
In the context of annuities, moral hazard means that the holding of annuities may
lead individuals to devote additional resources to life extension or to increasing
survival probabilities. Sheshinski (2008) argues that this type of moral hazard
leads to an inefficient resource allocation, characterized by overinvestment in
raising survival probabilities.
Sheshinski (2008) assumes that survival functions depend on a parameter
that individuals are able to affect. Individuals are able to affect the value of the
parameter by devoting additional resources, such as medical care and healthy
nutrition.
In a first-best situation, insurance firms are able to monitor the resources
devoted to life extension and make the rate of return on annuities depend on its
level. It should be emphasized that this first-best situation is a purely theoretical
possibility. In a second-best situation, the level of expenditures on longevity is
private, and the insurance firms are unable to make the rate of return on annuities
conditional on the level of these expenditures.
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) suggest that moral hazard is likely to play a
smaller role in annuity markets than in many other insurance markets. Sheshinski
(2008) argues, however, that even if moral hazard were to play a small role in
the annuity market, it is important to understand the potential direction of its
effect. Philipson and Becker (1998) note that the presence of an annuity affect
the amount of resources devoted to life extension. Davies and Kuhn (1992) also
emphasize the importance of moral hazard in annuity markets, and argue that
a complete analysis of annuity markets needs to consider both adverse selection
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and moral hazard.
Problems of Adverse Selection
The money’s worth of an annuity is increasing in the survival rate. This means
that annuities are worth more to people who expect to live longer. There is
therefore reason to suspect that annuity markets are plagued by adverse selection.
Theoretical research starting with Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), has emphasized the negative welfare consequences of adverse selection
in insurance markets. Among economists there is widespread agreement that
adverse selection is likely to be present in annuity markets (Cannon and Tonks,
2008: 192).
The problem of adverse selection arises because individuals have differing ex-
pected longevity and, more importantly, the information about their expected
longevity is private. In a first-best situation with perfect information, the in-
surer would offer actuarially fair annuities to all individuals, taking into account
every individual’s expected longevity. In a second-best situation with imper-
fect information, annuities are offered at the same price to all individuals - or
groups of individuals. If all individuals are identical to the insurer, there will be
a pooling equilibrium in which the equilibrium price is a function of the average
longevity of the annuitants, weighted by the equilibrium amount purchased by
different risk-classes.17 An important implication is that the amount of annu-
ities purchased by individuals with higher than average expected longevity will
be relatively high, while the opposite holds for individuals with lower than av-
erage life expectancy (Sheshinski, 2008: 67). If the insurer is able to identify
various risk-classes he may offer annuities at different prices to individuals be-
longing to different risk-classes. Unless he has perfect information, the problem
of adverse selection remains. The scope of adverse selection is, however, reduced
as the insurer gets more information and is able to diversify the annuities offered.
The Lemons Problem and Market Breakdown
Problems of adverse selection may lead to market breakdown - often referred to
as the lemons problem.18 If the individuals are identical to the insurer, the price
of an annuity is a function of the average longevity of the annuitants and will
17A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the individuals’ risk classes are unknown
and can not be revealed by their actions (Sheshinski, 2008: 67). High-risk individuals are in
this context the long-lived.
18See Akerlof (1970).
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equal the average money’s worth. If an individual expects to live longer than the
average mortality rates of the entire population on which annuities are priced,
he or she will find annuities more attractive than those who expect to have a
shorter life span. Ex post, premiums would have to rise if the insurance company
is to remain solvent. This decreases the attraction for those with a shorter life
expectancy, and their demand drops further. In this way the company is left
with ”lemons” or bad-risks - in this case, the long-lived. In the end, it may no
longer be viable for the insurance company to stay in the market. The greater
the adverse selection, the higher premium cost of a given annuity, and the greater
the total loss for society.
The possible failure of annuity markets is an argument in favour of a public
pension scheme providing insurance against outliving one’s resources.
Adverse Selection in Annuity Markets: Empirical Evidence
If agents were systematically wrong about their expected longevity, self-selection
into the annuity market would not be a problem. It is, however, reasonable to
assume that the subjective and the objective survival rates are correlated. The
findings of Hurd and McGarry (1995) suggest that this is indeed the case. In the
Health and Retirement Survey, respondents were asked about their subjective
survival rates. Hurd and McGarry (1995) find that the subjective probabilities
of surviving behave like actual probabilities of survival and that they aggregate
to population probabilities. They also find that the subjective probabilities of
survival covary with other variables in the same way that actual survival prob-
abilities vary with the same variables. For example, respondents with a higher
socioeconomic status gave higher probabilities of survival whereas respondents
who smoke gave lower probabilities.
Empirical evidence suggests that annuity markets are plagued by adverse
selection. As stressed by Chiappori and Salanie (2000), the empirical importance
of adverse selection in annuity markets is, however, debated. Brown (2001) use
U.S. data and find that annuitant mortality rates are systematically lower than
those for the general population. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) use a data set
consisting of annuitants at a large U.K. insurance company. They find, among
other things, evidence of selection in mortality rates. These selection effects,
they argue, are large. Furthermore, the findings of Rothschild (2009) indicate
that the market created by the U.K.’s 1808 Life Annuity Act was characterized
by adverse selection. He finds that annuitants were longer lived than the average
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individual in the population.
The Money’s Worth and Pension Take-Up
Two important determinants of annuity demand are the expected longevity,
which relates to the money’s worth of the annuity, and the individuals’ risk aver-
sion. Annuities provide insurance against the risk of outliving one’s resources.
For risk to be an important determinant, the risk of outliving one’s resources
must, however, be a relevant risk.
The savings of Norwegian citizens in the age group 55 - 64 years and of
individuals who have retired are relatively high (Halvorsen, 2011). It is therefore
reasonable to assume that the insurance value of delaying pension-take up is less
important to Norwegian citizens. In the empirical analysis I will therefore use
a measure related to the money’s worth of delaying pension take-up to explain
claiming behaviour, and disregard the insurance aspect of delaying pension take-
up.
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4 Economic Theory of Household Behaviour
4.1 Overview
The scope of this thesis is to investigate whether there exists empirical evidence
suggesting that Norwegian couples cooperate with regard to pension take-up. In
the previous chapter I discussed some factors that may affect the take-up decision
using theory for the demand for annuities. In order to complete the theoretical
framework of my thesis I will in this chapter present four models of household
behaviour.
Since Samuelson (1956) pointed out that the fundamental unit on the demand
side is the ”family”, various economic models have been proposed to explain
household demand. Different assumptions regarding preferences, degree of coop-
eration and ability to make binding agreements have implications for the models’
predictions about expenditure patterns and the extent to which the household
pools its resources. Basically there are four broad options for modelling house-
hold behaviour: the unitary approach, non-cooperative models, collective mod-
els and bargaining models (Browning and Lechene, 2001). In this chapter I will
present contributions from each approach. It is, however, beyond the scope of
this chapter to give an exhaustive overview of the existing economic models of
household behaviour. The scope is rather to show some of the variety in this
subfield of economics and how different assumptions give different predictions
with regard to cooperation on pension take-up.
I start by presenting the unitary model, which is the traditional way of mod-
elling household behaviour. The unitary approach assumes that the household
acts as one agent, by maximizing a social welfare function subject to the house-
hold budget constraint. Since the 1980’s, several non-unitary models of household
behaviour have been developed. A common feature of the non-unitary models is
that every member of the household is represented by distinct preferences. The
various non-unitary models rest, however, on different assumptions with regard
to preferences and the possibility to make binding agreements. As a consequence
their predictions with regard to household demands and cooperation differ. I will
present a non-cooperative model, a collective model and a cooperative bargaining
model.
The economic models of household behaviour are normally concerned with
how household demands for various goods are determined. They make predic-
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tions about expenditure patterns and how the demand changes as the distribu-
tion of income and prices change. These models were obviously not developed to
study the pension take-up decision in particular, but they are based on assump-
tions and give insight that can be used to make predictions about the degree of
cooperation on claiming pension benefits.
Two comments need to be made at this point. First, the models that I will
present are static models of household behaviour. An alternative approach would
be to present models with an intertemporal dimension. In my point of view
that would, however, complicate matters unnecessarily. Second, I assume the
existence of one private, one normal good and one public good. An alternative
approach would be to study household demand for annuities. The exposition
in the previous section showed, however, that several factors influence annuity
demand. I also argued that the insurance value of delaying pension take-up may
be of minor importance to the individuals in the sample of my empirical study in
chapter 5. In chapter 5 I will therefore investigate to which extent the money’s
worth of delaying pension take-up explains claiming behaviour, and disregard the
insurance value of a delay. With regard to the empirical analysis, the relevant
theoretical framework is thus the models’ predictions with regard to cooperation
and the extent to which the households pool their resources.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section I will
briefly give examples of private goods and public goods in a multi-person house-
hold, as well as a brief description of externalities in consumption. In the third
section I will present three broad types of preferences and their properties. Four
models of household behaviour and their predictions with regard to cooperation
on the claiming of pension benefits are presented in the fourth section. In the
fifth section I refer to some empirical findings to which this thesis relates.
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4.2 Goods and Consumption in a Two-Person Household
Within the household some of the goods are consumed jointly and non-exclusively.
The existence of such public goods may be a source of substantial economic
gains.19 This section emphasizes the distinction between private and public good
in a multi-person household.
Private Goods
Private goods are consumed non-jointly and are characterized by an exclusion
restriction property: the fact that one person consumes a particular apple de
facto excludes anyone else from consuming the same apple. In a multi-person
household some goods are private in nature. Examples of such goods are food
and clothes.
Public Goods
Public goods are consumed jointly and non-exclusively in the household. With
public goods no exclusion restriction exists: that a person enjoys seeing a beau-
tiful painting in her living-room does not preclude her spouse from enjoying it
just as much. Examples of public goods in the household are expenditures on
housing and children.
Due to public goods, there may be substantial economic gains from living in
a multi-person household.20 The reason is that several household members may
derive utility from the same good. On the contrary, there are no such gains from
goods that are non-excludable in nature in a single-person household.
Browning et al. (2011) makes several remarks with regard to the distinction
between private and public goods. Some commodities are sometimes used pub-
licly and sometimes privately, and a sharp distinction between the two types of
goods is here assumed for the sake of simplicity. First, many commodities are
sometimes used publicly and sometimes privately; for instance, a person can use
the car to go to work, or the whole family can use the car together. Second,
19According to Cowell (2005), a good is pure public good if it is non-rival and non-excludable.
In this context, I use the term ”public good” to refer to goods that are consumed jointly and
non-exclusively within the household. These goods are, however, not public goods in a wider
context. Alternative terms could be ”local public goods” or ”public goods in the household”
to distinguish them from pure public goods as specified by Cowell (2005). My use of the term
is in line with, for example, Browning et al. (2011).
20There may be other economic gains from living in a multi-person household as well. Agents
may for example gain by specializing in different tasks and there may be economies of scale in
household production.
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the privateness or publicness of a good may be dependent of the type of control
existing on that good and who exerts it. For example parents typically have
control over the (private consumption) of their young children.
Externalities in Consumption
Externalities within the household exist if the private consumption of a household
member affects the utility of other household members. Such externalities are
captured by the household members’ preferences.
An example of a negative externality is smoking. If a person smokes, this
may affect the well-being or utility of the other household members negatively.
Positive externalities, on the other hand, may exist if the household members
care for each other, and derives utility from other members’ consumption and
utility.
29
4.3 Preferences
The underlying preferences in the models of household behaviour have important
implications for the models’ predictions. It is therefore useful to discuss different
types of preferences before introducing the models. In microeconomic theory,
consumer preferences are usually assumed to be complete, reflexive, transitive
and continuous. It can be shown that when the preference ordering satisfies these
requirements, it can be represented by a continuous utility function (Varian,
1992: 95). This means that the very existence of a utility function, and the
resulting consumer maximization problem, relies on strict assumptions made
about preferences.
In the context of family behaviour, preferences can broadly be divided into
three categories. I will use the terminology used in Pollak (2003) and Browning
et al. (2011), and refer to these categories as egotistic preferences, deferential
preferences and non-deferential preferences. It should, however, be emphasized
that there is no consensus among authors on which terminology to adopt.
In the following I will use a specific context, namely a household consisting
of two persons a and b, to discuss preferences. To keep things simple I will
assume the existence of one public good, Q, and one private good, q.21 Let the
two persons, a and b, have utility functions Ua and U b and felicity functions ua
and ub, respectively. The felicity function measures the agents’ instantaneous
utility, or private utility, from consumption (Browning et al., 2011). Let Q be
the amount of public goods consumed by the household, while qa and qb are
the amounts of private goods that are consumed by a and b respectively. This
notation will be used throughout the chapter.
Egotistic preferences
Egotistic preferences refer to the case in which each individual only cares about
his or her own consumption, and this way of modelling preferences is the default
assumption in most subfields of economics (Pollak, 2003).22 In the absence of
externalities, these preferences can be formulated in the following way:
Ua(Q, qa) = ua(Q, qa)
U b(Q, qb) = ub(Q, qb) (3)
21An alternative approach is to let Q be a vector of N public goods and q be a vector of n
private goods.
22Egotistic preferences are sometimes referred to as egoistic preferences.
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Both persons’ preferences are defined solely over private consumption and the
level of the public good, and the other person’s consumption level does not enter
the utility function. This means that a person’s total utility (measured by the
utility function) and private utility (measured by the felicity function) coincide.
Deferential preferences
Another way of modelling preferences is by allowing for caring or interdepen-
dence. Deferential preferences are a particular type of interdependent prefer-
ences, and can be described as follows:
Ua(Q, qa, qb) = W a(ua(Q, qa), ub(Q, qb))
U b(Q, qa, qb) = W b(ua(Q, qa), ub(Q, qb)) (4)
where the aggregator functions W a(., .) and W b(., .) are Bergson-Samuelson so-
cial welfare functions, reflecting the ”weights” that each person places on their
own felicity functions relative to the other’s. Each person’s utility is directly a
function of both individuals’ felicity levels (Varian, 2006: 620-621).
Becker (1991) suggests that we call such preferences altruistic. Pollak (2003),
on the other hand, argues that it is more descriptive to call these preferences
deferential since each person defers to the judgement of the other regarding their
consumption: person a is not directly concerned with person b’s consumption
level, but rather with person b’s felicity level.
Non-deferential preferences
Non-deferential preferences are another kind of interdependent preferences. With
non-deferential preferences, person a and person b care directly about each
other’s consumption patterns. This type of preferences can be written in the
following way:
Ua(Q, qa, qb) = ua(Q, qa, qa)
U b(Q, qa, qb) = ub(Q, qa, qb) (5)
Non-deferential preferences exhibit a higher degree of interdependence than def-
erential preferences since each person cares directly about the other person’s
consumption pattern, instead of the partner’s felicity level. This is why they are
labeled non-deferential - the persons do not defer to the judgement of the other
31
regarding their consumption.
Say that person b enjoys drinking beer and eating hamburgers. With non-
deferential preferences person a may prefer that person b drinks less beer or have
fewer hamburgers, because it is bad for person b’s health, even though person
b is happy to eat hamburgers and drink beer. Put differently, non-deferential
preferences are compatible with each person preferring a different consumption
pattern for the other person than the other person would choose for himself or
herself. The motivation may be ”altruism”, but it can also be ”paternalism”
(Pollak, 2003: 118)
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4.4 Models of Household Behaviour
In this section I will present four models of household behaviour and their pre-
dictions with regard to cooperation on claiming pension benefits. This thesis
investigates whether Norwegian couples coordinate with regard to pension take-
up. I am therefore particularly concerned with the models’ predictions of house-
hold money management: that is, whether couples choose to pool their resources
(one-pot-strategy) or independent money management (two-pot-strategy). A one-
pot-strategy means that the partners pool their incomes into a ”household pot”,
while a two-pot-strategy means that the partners control their own income.
If couples choose a one-pot-strategy there is the possibility of cooperation
with regard to pension take-up. If independent money management is the cho-
sen strategy, each member of the couple controls his or her own income and the
claiming of old-age pension benefits is more likely to be an individual decision.
Two comments must be made at this point. First, even if the couple chooses
a two-pot strategy so that each member controls his or her own income, there
is the possibility of cooperation if preferences for example are interdependent
or if the couple can make binding and enforceable agreements. Secondly, even
if the household chooses a one-pot-strategy there may not be cooperation on
the pension take-up decision. In some bargaining models, for example, a per-
son’s contribution to the household pot may be important for that member’s
bargaining power and, as a consequence, for that member’s share of household
consumption after the pooling of resources. He or she may therefore be reluctant
to delay pension take-up, even if this increases expected lifetime income, since
this reduces his or her bargaining power for some period.
The models I will present are not primarily concerned with money manage-
ment, but implicitly makes assumptions in this regard. I will start by introducing
the unitary model, the standard framework for modelling household behaviour.
The unitary approach, which can be traced back to Samuelson (1956), is to as-
sume that the household is a single decision unit which maximizes a common
utility function with respect to a common budget constraint.
Since the 1980s this approach has been challenged by non-unitary models of
household behaviour. In the non-unitary models every member of the household
is represented by distinct preferences and these models can roughly be divided
into two categories: strategic (non-cooperative) models and collective (cooper-
ative) models. The second model I will introduce is an example of the former,
while the third is an example of the latter. Lastly, I will present a cooperative
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bargaining model and discuss the importance of threat points.
The Unitary Model
Until recently the standard approach to modelling household behaviour assumed
the existence of a household welfare function that aggregates the preferences of
all members. Maximizing this welfare function subject to the appropriate bud-
get constraint, the sum of all household incomes, yields demand functions for
goods and leisure. This approach is known as ”the unitary model”, reflecting
how the household acts, namely as one (Chiappori et al., 1993). This model
has been extended far beyond standard demand analysis to include the determi-
nants of education, health, fertility, child fostering, migration and labour supply
(Chiappori et al., 1993).
Samuelson (1956) was one of the first modern economists to address the
problem of family preferences, and the unitary approach can be traced back to
his article about social indifference curves. In this article Samuelson proves the
nonexistence of community indifference curves, but argues that this result does
not apply to family preferences. Conventional theory can be saved, he argues,
by adopting the hypothesis of a consistent ”family consensus” that represents a
meeting of the minds or a compromise between them (Samuelson, 1956). By con-
ventional theory he refers to the neoclassical theory of a rational consumer who
maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint. Samuelson does not, however,
suggest how such consensus is reached. In fact, many textbooks in microeco-
nomics adopt the unitary model, without discussing the rationale behind it. In
the chapter about the consumer, Cowell (2005) refers to ”the individual” and
the ”household” almost interchangeably.23
Solving the Model
Let P be the price of the public good, Q, and p the price of the private good, q.
Let Y a and Y b denote the income of a and b respectively and let Y denote total
household income. The household budget constraint is given by:
P ·Q+ p · (qa + qb) ≥ Y a + Y b ≡ Y
23Cowell (2005) argues that ”this distinction does not matter as long as (a) if the consumer
is a multi-person household, that household’s membership is taken as given and (b) any multi-
person household acts as though it were a single unit” (Cowell, 2005: 68-69). Cowell, however,
does not provide any theoretical justification for why these are reasonable assumptions.
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We assume the existence of a household welfare function, U˜(Q, qa, qb), that ag-
gregates the preferences of all household members. Assuming that U˜(Q, qa, qb)
is continuously differentiable and strictly concave, we know that the budget con-
straint will hold with equality. The household’s maximization problem can then
be written as the Lagrangian:
L = U˜(Q, qa, qb)− λ(PQ+ p(qa + qb)− Y )
The solution of this problem leads to demand functions of the following form:
Q = Q(P, p, Y )
qa = qa(P, p, Y )
qb = qb(P, p, Y ) (6)
An important implication of the unitary assumptions is that the demands for
the private and public goods only depend on prices and total household income,
and are independent of the distribution of income. Another central feature, that
follows from the first-order conditions, is that at optimum
∂U˜(Q, qa, qb)
∂qa
=
∂U˜(Q, qa, qb)
∂qb
⇒ ∂q
a
∂Y
=
∂qb
∂Y
At optimum the utility gain of a unit increase in person a’a consumption of
the private good is the same as the utility gain of a unit increase in person b’s
consumption of the private good. It follows that a marginal increase in household
income should increase the consumption of the private good by equal amounts.
Since dY = dY a + dY b, it follows that
∂qa
∂Y a
=
∂qa
∂Y b
=
∂qb
∂Y a
=
∂qb
∂Y b
,
∂U˜(Q, qa, qb)
∂Y a
=
∂U˜(Q, qa, qb)
∂Y b
(7)
This property is known as the income pooling hypothesis. When the income pool-
ing hypothesis is satisfied, the marginal utility of the household is independent
of the source of income, and so is the demand for the goods of the two persons.
Bu¨tikofer et al. (2009) argue that the term ”income pooling hypothesis” is
unfortunate since bargaining models as well may assume that the household
members first pool their resources and then divide the pool according to their
bargaining power. Under these circumstances, only rarely and by exception,
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will the income pooling hypothesis as described by (7), hold.24 Apps and Rees
(2007) argue that ”anonymity” would be a more proper term for what (7) implies,
namely that the identity of the income contributor does not matter for household
decisions or individual welfare.
An extension of the simple unitary model presented above, is to include the
felicity functions of the household members in the social welfare function. In
order for a model to be unitary, a necessary condition is that the Pareto-weights
measuring the relative importance of the felicity functions, are constant. The
household utility function can then be written as:
Uˆ(Q, qa, qb) = µ · ua(qa, Q) + (1− µ) · ub(qb, Q)
Maximizing this utility function to the proper household budget constraint yields
demand functions like in (6), and the income pooling hypothesis, as summarized
in (7), will hold.
A Non-Cooperative Model
The non-unitary models reject the existence of a unitary utility function. The
basic premise for this category of models is that households consist of individuals
with distinct preferences which can not be aggregated by a social welfare function.
According to these models, the key to study household behaviour is to study
individual behaviour and some decision process within the household.
Non-unitary models can be divided into two broad categories: non-cooperative
models and cooperative models. Non-cooperative models, also known as strate-
gic models, are characterized by the lack of any cooperation. Ermisch (2003),
for example, assumes that the family members are unable to communicate, and
so the best they can do is to behave according to the definition of a Nash equi-
librium. A perhaps more realistic way of motivating the non-cooperative models
is by observing that legal institutions do not provide for external enforcement
of contracts with regard to consumption, labour supply, and allocation within
marriage (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994). The non-cooperative model presented
here is based on Browning et al. (2011).
Assume that both members of the couple have egotistic preferences as de-
scribed by (3) and that both members control his or her own exogenous income.
They make each a voluntary contribution to the purchase of the public good, Qa
24For examples see Browning et al. (2011).
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and Qb, and use the remaining money to buy the private goods for themselves.
Let Q = Qa+Qb be the total household demand of the public good. The agents’
maximization problems are thus:
max
Qa,qa
{ua(Qa +Qb, qa) subject to P ·Qa + p · qa = Y a}
max
Qb,qb
{ub(Qa +Qb, qb) subject to P ·Qb + p · qb = Y b} (8)
We can make assumptions about the functional form of the utility functions to
get an explicit solution of these maximization problems. Ermisch (2003), for
example, assumes log-linear utilities of the following form:
Ua(Qa +Qb, qa) = α ln(qa) + (1− α) ln(Qa +Qb)
U b(Qa +Qb, qb) = β ln(qb) + (1− β) ln(Qa +Qb) (9)
The parameters α and β represent respectively the weights that person a and
person b put on the private good relative to the public good.
Since this is a non-cooperative or strategic model, both persons maximize
their own utility, taking the other person’s contribution to the purchase of the
public good as given. The maximization problems for person a and b are then:
max
Qa,qa
Ua(Qa +Qb, qa;Qb) = α ln(qa) + (1− α) ln(Qa +Qb)
subject to p · qa + P ·Qa = Y a (10)
max
Qb,qb
U b(Qa +Qb, qb;Qa) = β ln(qb) + (1− β) ln(Qa +Qb)
subject to p · qb + P ·Qb = Y b (11)
Assuming that both goods are normal, this interaction has exactly one Nash
equilibrium, which can take one of two forms. The first form is an interior
solution where both persons contribute to the public good. Assuming an interior
solution of the problem, we get the following demand functions for the public
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good25:
Qa =
(1− α)Y a
P
− αQb (12)
Qb =
(1− β)Y b
P
− βQa (13)
(15) and (16) represent the strategies for both individuals and are often called
their ”reaction functions”. The reaction functions show that the best strategy
for person a is to reduce his or her contribution to the public good when person
b increases his or her contribution, and the amount of this reduction depends on
the preferences, captured by the parameter α. In general lower values of α and
β implies that both persons’ utility levels depend strongly on the level of the
public good. In particular, we have that
lim
α→0
Qa = lim
α→0
[
(1− α)Y a
P
− αQb
]
=
Y a
P
lim
β→0
Qb = lim
β→0
[
(1− β)Y b
P
− βQa
]
=
Y b
P
(14)
This means that as α and β go to zero, both persons will devote all their income to
the purchase of the public good, independently of the other person’s contribution.
From person b’s reaction function, we see that:
• If person a does not contribute to the purchase of the public good, person
b will supply (1−β)Y
b
P
.
• In order to make person a not contribute, person b must supply an amount
greater than or equal to (1−α)Y
a
αP
.
• If (1− β)Y b < (1−α)Y a
α
they will both contribute.
The intersection of the two reaction functions yields the interior solution (Er-
misch, 2003: 23). The Nash equilibrium is then given by:
QaN =
(1− α)Y a − α(1− β)Y b
P (1− αβ) (15)
QbN =
(1− β)Y b − β(1− α)Y a
P (1− αβ) (16)
25See appendix A for calculations
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It follows that the total purchase of the public good is given by:
QN = Q
a
N +Q
b
N =
(1− α)(1− β)(Y a + Y b)
P (1− αβ) (17)
The demands for the private good are given by:
qaN =
α(1− β)(Y a + Y b)
p(1− αβ) (18)
qbN =
β(1− α)(Y a + Y b)
p(1− αβ) (19)
We conclude that when both members contribute to the purchase of the public
good, household’s market demands for both the public good and the private
good depend only on total household income and not on how it is distributed.
Redistribution of income has no effect on the choice of the level of public good
nor the individuals’ private consumption (Ermisch, 2003: 24). This means that
we have income pooling although we are considering a non-unitary model. This
result shows that while income pooling is a necessary condition for the unitary
model, it is not a sufficient one (Browning et al., 2011: 114). The income pooling
in this case is a local property, and it only holds as long as both persons contribute
to the public good.
The second form of the Nash equilibrium is one in which only one person
contributes to the public good. We know that person a will not contribute if:
Y a
Y a + Y b
<
α(1− β)
1− αβ
This means that person a will not contribute when his or her share of the family
income is relatively small. It is clear from the expression above that what is
a ”small share” depends on the preferences of each individual. The inequality
above is more likely to hold if person a sufficiently favours private consumption
over the private good, i.e. α is ”large”, and / or person b sufficiently favours the
public good, i.e. β is ”small” (Ermisch, 2003: 25). In this case we get that:
QN = Q
b
N =
(1− β)Y b
P
, qaN =
Y a
p
and qbN =
βY b
p
(20)
Redistribution from person b to person a reduces QN and q
b
N . Conversely, redis-
tribution in the other direction increases both QN and q
b
N . In other words, the
income pooling property does not hold.
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The non-cooperative models rest on very strict assumptions. Ermisch (2003)
argues, however, that the model can indicate what the ”fallback position” would
be if the communication and bargaining within the family breaks down, and how
individual preferences and incomes affect this fallback position.
An extension of this non-cooperative model is to allow for altruism. Becker
(1974) defines the ”head” of the household as the family member who trans-
fers purchasing power or money to the other members because he or she cares
about their welfare. Becker argues that a family with a head has the following
properties: ”A redistribution of income among members does not affect the con-
sumption or welfare of any member because it simply induces offsetting changes
in transfers from the head. Not only the head but other members too act ”as if”
they ”loved” all members, even when they are really selfish, in the sense that they
maximize not their own income alone but family income” (Becker, 1974). Since
the head is altruistic, all decisions are internalized and the household behaves as
though it is one.
A Collective Model
The collective models are cooperative models based on the hypothesis that the
household decision process leads to Pareto-efficient outcomes.26 An economic
situation is Pareto-efficient if there is no way to make some group of people
better off without making some other group of people worse off. Collective mod-
els assume that players can communicate freely and make binding, costlessly
enforceable agreements. In this way the couple can achieve an allocation such
that one person can not be made better off without making the other person
worse off. The process that leads to the Pareto-efficient allocation is not neces-
sarily specified and could in principle be a function of any variable that affects
the household environment. There are different ways of modelling the collective
model. The model presented below is based on Sheshinski (2008).27
Assume that the preferences of both persons are egotistic. A Pareto-efficient
26There is no consensus on the terminology and the terms may cause confusion. I use the
term non-unitary model to refer to all models that are not unitary, and in line with Browning
et al. (2011) and Chiappori and Donni (2009), I use the term collective model to refer the
non-unitary models that are based on the hypothesis that the decision process leads to Pareto-
efficient outcomes. Phipps and Burton (1998), on the other hand, argue that the common
characteristic of collective models is that husbands and wives are not assumed to have identical
utility functions, i.e. what I refer to as non-unitary models.
27See for example Chiappori and Donni (2009) and Browning et al. (2011) for alternative
approaches.
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allocation is the solution to:
max
qa,Q
Ua(Q, qa)
subject to U b(Q, qb) ≥ U¯ b and p(qa + qb) + PQ = Y a + Y b (21)
In other words, we maximize utility for one individual subject to the utility level
of the other person not falling below some target level and the budget constraint.
Since we have assumed that the utility functions are well-behaved, both con-
straints will hold with equality. The first-order conditions are:
∂Ua(Q, qa)
∂qa
= µ · ∂U
b(Q, qa)
¯
∂qb
∂Ua(Q,qa)
∂Q
∂Ua(Q,qa)
∂qa
+
∂Ub(Q,qb)
∂Q
∂Ub(Q,qb)
∂qb
=
P
p
(22)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the utility constraint.28 The
second line in (23) states that in the cooperative equilibrium the sum of both
persons’ marginal rates of substitutions between the public and the private good
equals the relative price of the public good.29
By varying the target levels of utility for person b we can trace out the
entire utility possibility frontier. This frontier is the locus of all Pareto optimal
utility levels for the two persons for given incomes and prices. Along the utility
possibility frontier, higher welfare for one person implies lower welfare for the
other, and there is therefore clearly a potential for conflict.
The demand functions take the following form:
Q = Q
(
Y a + Y b, p, P, µ
)
qa = qa
(
Y a + Y b, p, P, µ
)
qb = qb
(
Y a + Y b, p, P, µ
)
The implicit utility weighting factor µ indicates the location chosen on the util-
ity possibility frontier. In general, µ is a function of individual incomes and
prices, i.e., µ = µ(Y a, Y b, p, P ).30 µ can also be interpreted as an index of
the distribution of power within the household. The factors affecting µ would
28More precisely, µ is the shadow value for person a of relaxing the utility constraint, i.e., it
is a’s marginal utility from relaxing the constraint that U b(Q, qb) ≥ U¯ b.
29This property is known as the Samuelson condition for efficient provision of public goods.
30It should be noted that if µ is a constant the problem boils down to the unitary model.
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then include ”extra-environmental parameters” (McElroy, 1990) or ”distribution
factors” (Browning and Chiappori, 1998). These are variables that have an im-
pact on the distribution of power within the household without affecting neither
preferences nor the budget constraint. Examples include the relative incomes of
household members, divorce laws, social attitudes to the roles of men and women
and the outside option of the different members.
A Cooperative Bargaining Model
The process that leads to the Pareto-efficient allocation in the collective models is
not necessarily specified. If we specify the bargaining process, the model becomes
a bargaining model. A typical cooperative bargaining model of marriage begins
with a household that consists of two members, whose preferences are egotistic.
If the couple does not reach an agreement, then the payoff received is represented
by a ”threat point” (T a, T b) (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996).
In divorce-threat bargaining models, the threat point is the maximal level
of utility attainable outside marriage. In the separate spheres bargaining model
of Lundberg and Pollak (1993) the threat point is the utility associated with
an inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium.31 Let Za and Zb denote the extra-
environmental factors that affect the threat points of a and b respectively.
The Nash bargaining model provides the leading solution concept in bargain-
ing models of marriage. In this model, the household is thought to maximize
the product of the gains from cooperation subject to the household budget con-
straint:
max
qa,qb,Q
N = [Ua(qa, Q)− T a(Za)] [U b(qb, Q)− T b(Zb)]
subject to p(qa + qb) + PQ ≤ Y a + Y b (23)
The utility received by a and b in the Nash bargaining solution depends upon the
threat points. The higher one’s utility at the threat point, the higher utility in
the Nash bargaining solution. A person’s utility at the threat point can therefore
be thought of as a measure of his or her bargaining power.
The household demand for both the private and the public good will depend
on prices, household income and the determinants of the threat points (Lundberg
and Pollak, 1996).
31For example the equilibrium in the non-cooperative model.
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The One-Pot-Strategy and the Income Pooling Hypothesis
The terms ”income pooling” and ”income pooling hypothesis” may cause some
confusion. The income pooling hypothesis refers to the property that the house-
hold demands for various goods are independent of the distribution of income
within the household. The pooling of household incomes, however, does not
imply that the income pooling hypothesis necessarily holds. In some bargaining
models the household members first pool their resources and then divide the pool
according to their bargaining power. If relative income is a determinant of bar-
gaining power, household demand for various goods will not be independent of
the distribution of income. In particular, a change in the relative income shares
will affect the bargaining power.
The Claiming of Old-Age Pension Benefits:
An Example of the Models’ Predictions
When an agent eligible for early pension take-up turns 62, she has four possibili-
ties: (1) retire and claim benefits; (2) not retire and claim benefits; (3) retire and
not claim benefits; and (4) retire and claim benefits. The third possibility may
not be feasible for all agents, since in this case one must rely on previous savings,
non-wage income or some other income stream to finance current consumption.
This is the case I will consider below.
Let us assume that person a has decided to retire as she turns 62, and that
the relative money’s worth of delaying pension take-up is greater than unity.
We assume that the her savings are not sufficiently high to finance consump-
tion in the period of delay, and that she does not have any non-wage income.
We assume that agents are concerned with maximizing expected income, and
investigate the predictions of unitary models, non-cooperative models, collective
models and bargaining models with regard to cooperation on pension take-up.
The Unitary Model
The crucial assumption in the unitary approach is that the household pool their
resources to maximize a social welfare function. Another crucial assumption
is that the Pareto-weights measuring the relative importance of the household
members’ preferences are constant. The utility function being maximized is
therefore, by definition, independent of the distribution of income, and so are
the resulting demands for private and public goods.
An implication of these assumptions is that if the the household is concerned
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with maximizing expected income, the couple will coordinate in claiming pension
benefits. The couple will choose to delay person a’s pension take-up if person b’s
income is sufficiently high to finance their current consumption.
The Non-Cooperative Model with Egotistic Preferences
In the non-cooperative models there is, by assumption, no cooperation. I will
still investigate whether being in a couple may facilitate delaying pension take-
up. Consider first a non-cooperative model in which there is no public good.
Each person has egotistic preferences and maximizes his or her utility, defined
solely over private consumption, subject to the individual budget constraint. In
this case, when there is no interdependence in preferences, no public good and
no possibility to make binding agreements, being in a couple will not faciliate a
delay.
When we introduce the public good, the analysis changes and the model
makes less clear predictions. Both persons maximize their own utility, taking
the other person’s contribution to the public good as given. We know that this
maximization problem has one Nash equilibrium, which can take two forms: one
in which both persons contribute to the public good, and one in which only one
person contributes to the purchase of the public good. Since both persons have
egotistic preferences by assumption, neither of them will provide the other person
with any positive amount of the private good.
We are concerned with this model’s predictions when the income stream
of person a ceases. There are three equilibria to consider: first, both persons
contribute to the purchase of the public good; second, only person b contributes
to the public good; and third, only person a contributes to the purchase of the
public good.
First, when both persons contribute to the purchase of the public good, the
demands for the public and private goods are independent of the distribution
of income, i.e., the income pooling hypothesis holds. We know that for both
persons to contribute to the purchase of the public good, each person’s income,
as share of household income, must be sufficiently high. What is ”sufficiently
high” depends on the preferences of the individuals. If the income stream of
person a ceases, her share of household income will be relatively smaller, and the
equilibrium in which both persons contribute to the purchase of the public good
will break down. The couple will then move to the second equilibrium.
The second equilibrium is the one in which only person b contributes to the
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purchase of the public good. From person b’s reaction function we know that:
1. If person a does not contribute, person b will supply (1−β)Y
b
P
.
2. In order to make person a not contribute, person b must supply an amount
greater than or equal to (1−α)Y
a
αP
We are considering a case where person a is evaluating whether to delay pension
take-up or not. For this second possibility to be an equilibrium, person b must
provide a sufficiently large amount of the public good. What is a sufficiently
large amount depends on preferences, but we can state the following:
• When α decreases, i.e., person a’s relative preference for the public good
increases, the amount person b must provide of the public good in order to
make person a not contribute increases.32
• Person b’s income must be sufficiently high and / or her preferences for the
public good must be sufficiently high, so that (1− β)Y b > (1−α)Y a
α
.
• Person a must have strong preferences for the public good, since person b
never will provide her with any positive amount of the private good.
If these assumptions hold, person a can delay pension take-up and use previous
savings to purchase small amounts of the private good, while person b is the sole
contributor to the purchase of the public good. Person a is then a ”free-rider”:
she benefits from person b’s provision of the public good, without contributing
herself.
The third equilibrium is one in which only person a contributes to the pur-
chase of the public good. If person a delays pension take-up, her share of house-
hold income will, by assumption, be to small for this to be an equilibrium.
In the non-cooperative model there is no cooperation, and the individuals
maximize their own utility subject to the budget constraint. I have argued,
however, that under some assumptions it is possible for person a to benefit from
being member of a household and delay pension take-up. For this to be the case,
person b’s income must be sufficiently high and / or her preferences for the public
good must be sufficiently high. Person a must also have strong preferences for
the public good, since person b never will provide her with any positive amount
of the private good. If these assumptions do not hold, it is not possible for person
a to delay pension take-up in this model.
32If we differentiate the expression in (2) with respect to α we get: ddα = − Y
a
α2P < 0.
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When we allow for altruism in the non-cooperative model the analysis changes.
In particular, if person b has interdependent preferences and cares about the pri-
vate consumption of person a, the assumptions under which the second possibility
is an equilibrium are relaxed. This is because person b may now choose to trans-
fer money to a since her income is low.
The Collective Model
Collective models are based on the assumption that, by allowing the couple to
cooperate and communicate, the members will reach a Pareto-efficient allocation.
Since the outcome, by assumption, is Pareto-efficient we expect that the couple
will cooperate on claiming pension benefits. Although we assumed that both
members have egotistic preferences, defined solely over their own consumption
of the private and the public good, they can now make binding and enforceable
agreements to maximize household income, from which they both may benefit.
In the collective model individual incomes matter for choices when the relative
income shares affect the sharing rule, perhaps by affecting bargaining power
(Ermisch, 2003: 29). According to Ermisch (2003), we expect heterogeneity in
preferences to produce differences among households in whether joint household
income or individual income determine the demands for private and public goods.
This is the case even if the members of the couple have the same preferences,
because each person’s private consumption is affected.
This complicates the analysis. An implicit assumption in this model is that
the household pools their resources and divide the pool according to a sharing
rule. If the sharing rule is determined by relative income shares in each time
period, person a’s bargaining power will be significantly reduced while she delays
pension take-up. Later, when she claims pension benefits, she will have more
bargaining power compared to if she claims benefits right away. In this case, the
outcome may depend on both persons’ subjective discount factor. If person a
has strong preferences for current consumption, she may be reluctant to delay
pension take-up if the sharing rule is determined by relative income shares in each
period. Similarly, person b may be reluctant to coordinate if he has relatively
stronger preferences for future consumption and his bargaining power in the
future is reduced as a consequence of person a delaying pension take-up.
The analysis changes if the sharing rule takes into account the expected future
increase in person a’s income. In these models the couple can make binding and
enforceable agreements, so this is perhaps a more likely scenario in this model.
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After all, the collective models are based on the assumption that the household
will reach a Pareto-efficient allocation: in these models no resources are left on
the table.
The Cooperative Bargaining Model
With regard to the pension take-up decision in the cooperative bargaining model,
the determinants of the threat points are especially important. The threat points
may be external to the marriage, as in divorce-threat bargaining models, or in-
ternal to the marriage, like in the private spheres bargaining model of Lundberg
and Pollak (1993).
An external threat point is the maximal level of utility attainable outside
marriage. Examples of factors that influence an external threat point are com-
petition in the marriage market, individual characteristics and income available
to divorced women and men (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). An internal threat
point, on the other hand, is the utility associated with an inefficient equilibrium
in which the couple no longer cooperates. It is reasonable to assume that the
distribution of income is an important determinant of the internal threat points:
if cooperation breaks down, each person uses his or her own income to finance
private consumption and make voluntary contributions to the purchase of the
public good.
In both collective models and cooperative bargaining models the notion of
bargaining power is important. Unlike the collective models, the cooperative
bargaining models, however, do not assume that the allocation agreed upon nec-
essarily is Pareto-efficient. With regard to person a’s pension take-up decision,
the predictions of the cooperative bargaining model are not obvious. On the one
hand, delaying person a’s pension take-up increases expected household income
and the pool to be divided. This is an argument in favour of cooperation. On
the other hand, if person a delays claiming, both her utility attainable outside
marriage and her utility associated with an inefficient internal equilibrium will
increase in the future. This means that her bargaining power will increase. If
the latter of the two effects dominate, person b may be reluctant to cooperate,
even though the delay will increase the expected pool to be divided.
Some cooperative bargaining models rest on the assumption that the couples
can make binding agreements. In this case, we expect the couple to agree upon
a Pareto-efficient allocation.
47
Summary
The models presented make different predictions with regard to cooperation on
the claiming of pension benefits. These predictions can be summarized as follows:
• According to the unitary model, the couple will indeed cooperate. An un-
derlying assumption of the unitary model is that the household maximizes
a household utility function subject to a household budget constraint.
• In the collective model individual incomes matter for choices when the rel-
ative income shares affect the sharing rule. An underlying assumption of
the model is, however, that the couple can make binding and enforceable
agreements. We therefore expect them to reach a Pareto-efficient agree-
ment.
• If there is no public good, the prediction of the non-cooperative model is
that being in a couple do not facilitate delaying pension take-up.
• If there is a public good, the prediction of the non-cooperative model is
that being in a couple may, under circumstances, facilitate delaying pension
take-up. For this to be the case, the partner’s income must be sufficiently
high, and both persons must sufficiently favour the public good. If these
assumptions are not satisfied, being in a couple does not facilitate the
take-up.
• The cooperative bargaining model makes no clear prediction. On the one
hand, delaying person a’s pension take-up increases expected household
income and the pool to be divided. On the other hand, delaying pension
take-up will increase the value of his outside options, and increase his bar-
gaining power. Person b may be reluctant to cooperate if the latter effect
dominates.
The models make predictions with regard to what we should expect from the
empirical investigation in chapter 5. According to the unitary model and the
collective model we should expect that the couples coordinate on the claiming
of pension benefits. The non-cooperative model, by assumption, predicts that
the members will not cooperate. If the partner’s income is sufficiently high and
if both members sufficiently favours the public good, being in a couple may
however facilitate delaying pension take-up. The cooperative bargaining model
makes less clear predictions.
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4.5 Existing Empirical Findings
Due to the complexity of its topic, this thesis relates to various strands of the
existing empirical literature. This section provides an overview of some empirical
findings, but the overview is by noe means exhaustive. Two types of studies
will be presented. First, previous studies of couples and the claiming of Social
Security benefits, and secondly, previous studies on the degree of income pooling
in the household.
Couples and the Take-Up Decision
The existing studies of couples and claiming behaviour that I am aware of, inves-
tigate the take-up of Social Security benefits. These existing empirical findings
are relevant for this thesis since the Norwegian pension scheme and the Social
Security programme are characterized by similar rules. A key feature of both the
Norwegian and the American system is that retirement need not be concurrent
with claiming of benefits. In the U.S., workers can claim Social Security benefits
in the age range 62 - 70. The pension scheme is actuarial neutral on average,
meaning that the present value of expected lifetime Social Security benefits for
an individual with average life expectancy is the same, regardless of the timing
of pension take-up. In contrast to the Norwegian pension scheme, there is means
testing.33 For married couples there are also spouse and survivor benefits. If a
member of the couple has a low earning’s history he or she may be entitled to
a spouse benefit which equals half of the partner’s benefit. In addition to the
spouse benefit, a survivor benefit is paid when the primary earner of the house-
hold dies. The survivor benefit is equal to the benefit received by the deceased
when he or she was alive. Total lifetime benefits the household will receive are
affected by the primary earner’s claim age, because retired worker and dependent
benefits both vary with the actuarial adjustments applied to monthly benefits
(Henriques, 2012). A major difference between Norway and the U.S. with regard
to benefit take-up is that a majority of American women receive most of their
Social Security benefits based upon their husbands’ earnings history.
The notion that the present value of Social Security benefits is the same
regardless of the timing of benefit take-up is valid for workers with average ex-
pected longevity. Since individuals have differing expected longevity, the Social
Security scheme is, like the Norwegian pension scheme, potentially exposed to
33If the earnings of an individual who has claimed Social Security benefits are above a certain
threshold, his benefits will be reduced.
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problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.34 A common feature of the
studies presented below is the use of the present value of expected benefits as a
measure of Social Security wealth at different claiming ages to explain the timing
of benefits take-up.
Coile et al. (2002) use data from the 1982 New Beneficiary Survey and analyze
the claiming of Social Security benefit of single and married men, who retired
before they turned 62. They calculate the net present value of future benefit
streams for a single worker and for a married couple and use these calculations
to examine the variation in incentives for claiming delays among subgroups of the
population.35 When calculating the net present value of future benefit streams for
a married couple, Coile et al. (2002) considers a one-earner couple and implicitly
assume that the husbands consider the incentives from his own benefit and any
benefit received by his spouse equally when deciding when to claim.36 They argue
that under a wide variety of circumstances, delayed claiming is optimal, and that
the gains of delaying benefit take-up can be quite substantial. In particular the
incentive to delay is stronger if the claimant has a longer life expectancy, and
married men generally have a stronger incentive to delay claiming than do single
men, due to the spouse and survivor benefits.
The authors’ main finding is that the majority of men in the sample claimed
pension benefits as soon as they became eligible. A substantial minority did,
however, delay benefit take-up. Investigating this subgroup, the authors found
that men with longer life expectancies have longer delays. Coile et al. (2002)
did not, however, find support for the hypothesis that married men have longer
delays than single men. In addition, the average delay was relatively short and
far less prevalent than theory would predict. The study also identified household
wealth as a determinant of claiming age, with both rich and poor households
claiming relatively early. According to Coile et al. (2002) this reflects impatience
and / or liquidity constraints at low wealth levels, and a strong bequest motive
at high wealth levels.
Hurd et al. (2004) use data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine
the relationship between mortality risk and retirement, and mortality risk and
34Davies and Kuhn (1992) develop a theoretical framework to study the effects of social
security when individuals can take hidden actions to affect their longevity.
35Another technique used by Coile et al. (2002) is expected liquidity maximization under liq-
uidity constraints. This approach has the advantage of capturing the insurance value of Social
Security. Due to computational complexity, the expected maximization model is calculated for
single workers only.
36This means that the unitary model is assumed implicitly.
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the propensity to take early, reduced Social Security benefits. They find that
individuals with low subjective probabilities of survival retire earlier and claim
earlier than those with higher subjective probabilities. These effects are not large,
and the great majority of workers claim as soon as they are eligible. Also Hurd
et al. (2004) emphasize that married workers have a greater financial benefit
to delay the take-up of Social Security benefits than single workers, since the
surviving spouse can inherit the benefit of the retired worker. This effectively
increases the life expectancy of the couple. The authors find that married workers
do delay claiming: being married leads to about 1.1 month delay in claiming.
Like Coile et al. (2002), Hurd et al. (2004) found that agents claim much earlier
than the ages that would maximize the households’ Social Security wealth. The
high levels of early claiming, they argue, is a major puzzle.
The study of Henriques (2012) is concerned with how individuals respond to
the different incentives in the Social Security scheme. According to the studies of
Coile et al. (2002) and Hurd et al. (2004), American men claim earlier than the
age that would maximize the households’ net present value of future benefits. By
focusing on household incentives, it is implicitly assumed that the primary earner
takes all household benefits into consideration when making the claiming deci-
sion. Such an approach assumes that the primary earner is indifferent between
the types of benefits received by the household over all points in time, regardless
of whether he or she is alive when the benefits are received. This assumption
is not unproblematic: it is possible that individuals respond differently to three
different types of incentives built into the Social Security scheme. Early benefit
take-up by a married man has three implications. First, his pension benefits will
be reduced through the actuarial adjustment; secondly, the spouse benefit will
be reduced; and third, the survivor benefit will be reduced. Henriques (2012)
shows that there is a positive relationship between husbands’ claiming behaviour
and the actuarial incentives built into the retired worker benefit formula. Em-
pirical evidence do not, however, indicate that claiming behaviour responds to
incentives from either total household benefits or the dependent benefits paid to
wives in any significant way.
Sass et al. (2007) point out that these existing empirical findings on Social
Security benefit take-up are in contrast with economic theory. That most mar-
ried American men claim Social Security benefits at age 62 or 63, which is earlier
than the age that maximizes the household’s expected present value of benefits,
is not in accordance with the unitary model nor cooperative bargaining mod-
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els.37 Sass et al. (2007) found that the general pattern of early pension take-up
by married men (1) leaves Social Security wealth ”on the table”; (2) sharply
reduces benefit receipt at a time when only the wife is likely to be alive, and
(3) significantly increase the risk that the wife will face hardship should she be-
come a widow. The authors consider two variables that could lead to such early
claiming: ignorance and household decision-making. A question is whether in-
dividuals truly understand the incentives built into the Social Security scheme,
or whether caddishness could lead husbands to claim early. In doing this, they
control for factors that have been identified to influence claiming behaviour -
expected longevity and household wealth.
In the sample studied by Sass et al. (2007) the only statistically significant
characteristic differentiating later from early claimers is higher education. The
authors interpret the relationship between education and delayed claiming as the
effect of greater financial awareness.38 In particular, they do not find empirical
evidence indicating that early claimers are more caddish than individuals who
delay benefit take-up. The study concludes by stating that social convention
is the primary explanation of sub-optimal claiming behaviour, and that finan-
cial awareness is the primary corrective. Sass et al. (2007) argue that this is
in line with the broader household bargaining literature, which emphasizes the
importance of social convention in influencing outcomes.39
Munnell and Soto (2005) points out that in particular women, who on average
have longer life expectancy than men, would gain from delaying the take-up of
Social Security benefits. They point out that women, even more than men, tend
to claim Social Security benefits as soon as they become eligible. To find the
key to this puzzle, the authors study the claiming patterns of men and women
by marital status. Munnell and Soto (2005) observe that a significantly smaller
percentage of single women claim benefits early than either married or single
men. This, they argue, makes sense since women on average live longer than
the ”break-even” age, which means that they will enjoy the higher benefits they
get from postponing pension take-up for enough additional years to more than
compensate for the pension benefits forfeited. Married women, on the other
37Sass et al. (2007) argue that according to cooperative bargaining models, the couple will
maximize household surplus. The husband might, however, claim early if the wife is unable to
offer an appropriate compensation of delayed claiming.
38The authors do not, however, find any statistically significant relationship between the age
of claiming and their measure of financial literacy.
39The authors emphasizes that due to the small sample size and limited variance in the
dependent variable the results must be viewed as extremely tentative.
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hand, are more likely to claim benefits early than single and married men.
The authors emphasize that single women and married women face very dif-
ferent choices. The reason is that married women are entitled to three types of
benefits: a benefit based on their own earnings record; a spouse benefit equal
to 50 percent of their husband’s benefit if that exceeds their own benefit; and a
survivor’s benefit. From the wife’s perspective, claiming age does not affect the
survivor’s benefit. This means that the decision over which the wife has control
is when to claim the benefits she receives until the death of her husband. The
relevant life expectancy is therefore that of her husband. Since these benefits
are expected to be received for a period shorter than the life expectancy of the
average person, the wife has an incentive to claim early.
The Income Pooling Hypothesis
Among the economic models of household behaviour the unitary model, in par-
ticular, makes very clear predictions that can be tested empirically. Its main
prediction is that household demands for various goods are independent of the
distribution of income. This property is sometimes present in non-unitary mod-
els as well, but it is then a local property. A rejection of the income pooling
hypothesis is therefore tantamount to a rejection of the unitary model. There
are several studies investigating whether the distribution of income within the
household makes a difference to household demands.
Using survey data on family health and nutrition in Brazil, Thomas (1990)
finds that households’ demand are not independent of the distribution of income.
The study shows that non-wage income in the hands of the mother has a bigger
impact on the family’s health than income attributed to the father. For child
survival probabilities, the effect is almost 20 times bigger. The income pooling
hypothesis is therefore rejected by Thomas (1990).
Bourguignon et al. (1993) test whether the income pooling hypothesis can
be accepted for French consumption data. This is done by testing whether the
coefficients of the various components of family income - earnings of both mem-
bers and property or transfer income - are significantly different in explaining
the total expenditures of various consumption goods. The authors find that for
a given level of total income, the share of husband’s and wife’s own income sig-
nificantly affects the structure of consumption. The income pooling hypothesis
is therefore rejected.
Also the study by Lundberg et al. (1997) rejects the income pooling hypoth-
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esis. The authors use a policy change in the United Kingdom that transferred a
substantial child allowance to wives in the late 1970s. Using Family Expenditure
Survey data Lundberg et al. (1997) find that a shift toward greater expenditures
on women’s clothing and children’s clothing relative to men’s clothing coincided
with this income redistribution. This, they argue, indicates that the distribution
of income matters for household demands’ for various goods.
Phipps and Burton (1998) use microdata from the 1992 Statistics Canada
Expenditure Survey to provide evidence that male and female incomes do not
always exert identical influence on household expenditures. They find, however,
that incomes may be pooled for some categories of consumption (e.g. housing)
while the income pooling hypothesis must be rejected for others.
Overall, empirical evidence suggest that the distribution of income matter
for household demands. While these empirical studies reject the income pooling
hypothesis, it is important to emphasize that they do not reject that hypothesis
that couples pool their resources and cooperate to maximize household income.
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5 Data and Empirical Findings
This chapter is outlined as follows. The first section provides a description of the
data set that I will use for the empirical analysis and a description of aggregate
claiming behaviour and retirement in 2011. I will also explain how Brinch et al.
(2013) estimate expected longevities for the Norwegian cohort of 1949 within
the framework of the microsimulation model MOSART, and how the authors
use these estimates to calculate the relative money’s worth (RMW) of delaying
pension take-up from age 62 to 67 for each individual. In the second section
I investigate how own income and wealth, partner’s income and the RMW of
delaying pension take-up can explain the choice to retire without claiming old
age pension benefits. In the third section I investigate the pension take-up by
couples where both members were born in 1949 and eligible for early pension take-
up in 2011. I use the RMW of delaying pension take-up for both members in two
different ways to estimate the probability of only one of the members claiming old
age pension benefits. At last, I investigate whether empirical evidence suggest
that the individuals in the latter sample understand the incentives in the pension
scheme.
5.1 The Data Set
When the pension reform was implemented in January 2011, a large number of
individuals aged 62 - 66 became eligible for early pension take-up. Like Brinch
et al. (2013) I will focus on the group of Norwegian citizens who became eligible
for pension take-up throughout 2011 by turning 62 years. The new pension take-
up rules were implemented in January 2011, but already in December 2004 the
Norwegian government issued a White Paper setting out a strategy for the new
pension scheme (Stortingsmelding nr. 12 2004 - 2005, 2004). The new pension
rules were therefore anticipated, and the larger 62 - 66 years sample is therefore
self-selected in a complicated way. In short, a large subgroup of these individuals
had the opportunity to take up the old early retirement scheme in 2010 or earlier.
In addition, they had the opportunity to evaluate whether it would be beneficial
for them to take up the old system or wait until January 2011 and take up the
new flexible pension. The advantage of using the smaller sample of 62 year-olds
is that this subgroup was never exposed to the old retirement scheme. In this
regard they are also representative for later birth cohorts.
The starting point for my analysis is therefore all Norwegian citizens born be-
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tween January and November 1949 and eligible for early pension take up during
2011; 23 409 individuals.40 For these individuals I have data from the Directory
of Taxes’ LTO-register on annual incomes in 2010 and 2011.41 Further, I have
administrative register data on wealth, marital status, partner’s income, educa-
tion and pension take-up in 2011. With regard to marital status I am concerned
with whether an individual is married, registered with a partner or living as a
cohabitant. If a person is non of the above, I consider him or her as single.
Like in Brinch et al. (2013), an individual is considered retired if he is reg-
istered as retired in the employer/employee register or if his annual income is
reduced by a certain relative amount from 2010 to 2011.42 By evaluating re-
tirement in terms of reduced income it is possible that individuals who retired
partially are defined as retired. Since data from the LTO-register are used to
evaluate retirement, individuals who are self-employed are excluded from the
sample.43 This leaves a sample of 17 020 individuals. Table 2 provides a descrip-
tion of aggregate claiming and retirement behaviour for this group in 2011.
Table 2: Aggregate claiming and retirement behaviour of 17 020 individuals
eligible for early pension take-up in 2011, employed in private sector or public
sector firms.
Retired Not Retired Total
All
Not claiming 1 964 (11.5 %) 9 789 (57.5 %) 11 753 (69.0 %)
Claiming 1 511 (8.9 %) 3 756 (22.1 %) 5 267 (31.0 %)
Total 3 475 (20.4 %) 13 545 (79.6 %) 17 020 (100.0 %)
Working in private sector firm
Not claiming 990 (11.5 %) 4 896 (48.1 %) 5 886 (57.8 %)
Claiming 1 346 (13.2 %) 2 948 (28.9 %) 4 294 (42.1 %)
Total 2 336 (22.9 %) 7 844 (77 %) 10 180 (100.0 %)
Working in public sector firm
Not claiming 974 (14.2 %) 4 893 (71.5 %) 5 867 (85.8 %)
Claiming 165 (2.4 %) 808 (11.8 %) 973 (14.2 %)
Total 1 139 (16.7 %) 5 701 (83.3 %) 6 840 (100.0 %)
40Individuals born in December 1949 were not eligible for claiming pensions until January
2012.
41Skattedirektoratets Lønns- og trekksoppgaveregister in Norwegian.
42The employer / employee register is the English translation of Arbeidsgiver- og arbeid-
stakerregisteret.
43Individuals who are self-employed report their incomes the year after.
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The data on aggregate behaviour shows that the correlation between retire-
ment from the labour force and the claiming of old age pensions is far from per-
fect. These findings indicate that individuals make separate decisions of whether
to retire from the labour market and claim old age pensions. Table 3 provides
some descriptive statistics.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of 17 020 individuals eligible for early pension
take-up in 2011, employed in private sector or public sector firms.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Expected longevity 17 020 86.604 2.1522 76.163 92.587
RMW 17 020 1.0400 0.0253 0.8881 1.1547
Male 17 020 0.733 0.4426 0 1
Couple 17 020 0.811 0.3913 0 1
Variable (2010) Obs. Median Std. Dev.
Labour income 17 020 526 989 304 986
Wealth 17 020 464 755 3 733 538
Partner’s lab. income 13 744 333 970 272 100
The Relative Money’s Worth of Delaying Pension Take-Up
The actuarial adjustments in the pension system are based on average mortal-
ity risks for a cohort, and do not vary over individuals. For each individual, it
therefore makes sense to think about the money’s worth of the implicit annuity
of delaying take-up as a function of their expected longevity. When studying an-
nuity demand the relevant measure of mortality risk is the individuals’ subjective
expectations. In absence of data on subjective expectations, a good approxima-
tion is to use the expected longevity based on observable characteristics. It is
reasonable to expect that these variables are correlated if individuals form their
subjective expectations in a rational way.44
In their study of adverse selection in the Norwegian pension scheme, Brinch
et al. (2013) estimate the expected longevity for all Norwegian citizens born in
1949, alive in 2011 and eligible for early pension take-up during 2011. They
do this in two steps. First, the authors estimate a mortality model on the full
Norwegian population in the years 2001 - 2010. Among the explanatory variables
44For a discussion of subjective expectations and expected longevity, see for example Hurd
and McGarry (1995).
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in the mortality model are education, disability status, civil status and parents’
longevity. Separate mortality models are estimated for women and men.
The second step is to to use the estimated mortality model to predict expected
longevities for the Norwegian birth cohort of 1949. Within the framework of the
MOSART microsimulation model, the mortality model is simulated 900 times
for each individual of the actual Norwegian birth cohort of 1949. The expected
longevity for each individual is calculated as the average of the simulated results.
Brinch et al. (2013) use the estimated expected longevity to calculate the
relative money’s worth (RMW) of delaying pension take-up from age 62 to 67.
The authors define this measure in the following way:
RMW =
E
(∑∞
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(1+r)a−62A
67
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)
E
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sa
(1+r)a−62A
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a
) (24)
where A62a and A
67
a denote the income stream at age a conditional on claiming
pensions at age 62 and 67 respectively, sa is the probability of surviving age
a, and r is the discount rate. The numerator is the expected stream of future
pension benefits if the individual claims benefits at age 67, while the denominator
is the expected stream of future pension benefits if the agent claims at age 62.
Delaying pension take-up increases expected lifetime income if RMW > 1.
In order to calculate the RMW it is, however, necessary to make assumptions
about the discount rate. The cutoff of who will gain from and who will lose from
delaying pension take-up will therefore vary for different values of the discount
rate. The absolute levels of the RMW for the individuals are not so important
for the empirical analysis in this chapter. What is important in the regressions
is rather the deviation in individuals’ RMW from the mean RMW. This is much
more robust to assumptions about average longevities and discount rates than
the absolute levels.
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5.2 Retiring without Claiming Pension Benefits
In this section I will investigate whether partner’s income can explain the choice
to retire without claiming old age pension benefits. It is reasonable to assume
that the decision to retire without claiming old age pension benefits is determined
by own income, partner’s income, wealth and the RMW of delaying pension
take-up. If own income and wealth are high, an individual is less likely to be
liquidity constrained. If partner’s income is high, this may facilitate retiring
from the labour force without claiming old age pension benefits. Ultimately, we
expect the decision to retire without claiming benefits to depend on the RMW of
delaying pension take-up. While own income, wealth and partner’s income may
relax liquidity constraints, we expect the RMW to be the variable motivating
the decision: one can hardly think of any other reason underlying the decision
to retire without claiming benefits if not because of some financial gain.
It is not possible to receive public sector contractual early retirement pension
and pension from the National Insurance Scheme at the same time. This means
that individuals who retire from the public sector lose their contractual pension
rights if they claim pension benefits from the National Insurance Scheme. I will
therefore exclude employees in the public sector in this analysis. This reduces
the number of observations from 17 020 to 10 180. Since I am concerned with
economic cooperation in the household, I will also exclude single individuals
from the sample. This reduces the number of observations from 10 180 to 8 458
individuals. Table 4 provides a description of aggregate claiming and retirement
for this group i 2011.
Table 4: Aggregate claiming and retirement of 8 458 individuals who were born
in 1949, employed in the private sector, member of a couple and eligible for early
pension take-up in 2011.
Retired Not Retired Total
Not claiming 808 (9.5 %) 4 007 (47.4 %) 4 815 (56.9 %)
Claiming 1 128 (13.3 %) 2 515 (29.7 %) 3 643 (43.1 %)
Total 1 936 (22.9 %) 6 522 (77.1 %) 8 458 (100.0 %)
We notice that for the majority, 60.7 %, the decision to retire and the decision
to claim old age pension benefits appear to be the same decision. 47.4 % did
not retire nor claim old age pension benefits, while 13.3 % retired and claimed
pension benefits. For a significant number of individuals, however, the timing of
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retirement and the timing of benefit take-up did not coincide. 29.7 % claimed
benefits without retiring, while 9.5 % retired without claiming old age pension
benefits. This observation confirms that the decision to retire and the decision to
claim pension benefits are indeed decoupled. Table 5 provides some descriptive
statistics of the sample.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of 8 458 individuals born in 1949, eligible for
early pension take-up in 2011, member of a couple, employed in private sector
or public sector firms.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Expected longevity 8 458 86.285 1.6693 76.662 92.274
RMW 8 458 1.0352 0.0204 0.9064 1.1547
Male 8 458 0.859 0.3481 0 1
Variable (2010) Obs. Median Std. Dev.
Labour income 8 458 521 372 356 155
Wealth 8 458 495 914 4 571 330
Partner’s lab. income 8 436 306 241 241 037
While individuals who retire before they claim old age pension benefits may
be liquidity constrained, this is not a relevant problem for individuals who claim
old age pension benefits before they retire. Since I am concerned with economic
cooperation in the household, I will therefore investigate the decision to retire
from the labour force without claiming old age pension benefits.
In this section I will estimate two linear probability models. In the first
model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if an
individual retired without claiming benefits. I will estimate the model on the
sample of individuals who were born in 1949, members of a couple, eligible for
early pension take-up in 2011 and employed in the private sector (N = 8 458).
In the second model the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if an individual did not claim pension benefits. This model is estimated
using a subsample of the 10 180 observations, namely the individuals who were
born in 1949, members of a couple, eligible for early pension take-up in 2011,
employed in the private sector and who retired in 2011 (N = 1 936).
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The Regressors
I use the individual’s own income (Y ) and wealth (W ), partner’s income (PY )
and the relative money’s worth (RMW ) of delaying the pension take-up from
age 62 to 67 as regressors to estimate two linear probability models.
I do not use the absolute level of income as a regressor. Instead I create
dummy variables for each quartile of income, using the lower quartile as the
reference value. The dummy variable Y (2)i takes the value 1 if individual i is in
the second quartile or above, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Y (3)i takes the value
1 if individual i is in the third quartile or above, and 0 otherwise. Finally, Y (4)i
takes the value 1 if individual i is in the upper quartile, and 0 otherwise. I create
similar dummy variables for wealth and partner’s income.
The regression equations I want to estimate are of the following form:
Zi = α0 + α1 · Y (2)i + α3 · Y (3)i + α4 · Y (4)i + α5 ·W (2)i
+α6 ·W (3)i + α7 ·W (4)i + α8 · PY (2)i + α9 · PY (3)i
+α10 · PY (4)i + α11 ·RMWi + ei (25)
The Probability of Retiring without Claiming Benefits
In the first regression the the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if an individual retired without claiming benefits. I run the regression
using all observations in the sample (N = 8 458). The regression results are
reported in Appendix B. Stata automatically tests the model’s overall significance
by conducting an F-test. The reported p-value is 0.0011, so we reject the null
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero with high confidence.
In the estimated model, the dummy variable indicating whether an individual
is in the upper quartile of the income distribution is the only significant variable.45
The estimated coefficient is 0.0371, meaning that as an individual moves from
the third to the upper quartile of the income distribution, the probability of
retiring without claiming pension benefits increases by 3.7 percentage points.
None of the coefficients for partner’s income or wealth are significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Nor is the coefficient of the RMW of delaying pension take-up.
We also note that the coefficient of the RMW has the opposite sign of what we
would expect.
45For each estimated coefficient, Stata automatically conducts a two-sided t-test, testing the
null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero against the alternative hypothesis that the estimated
coefficient is different from zero.
61
The estimated coefficient for moving from the first to the second quartile
of the income distribution is not significant. Nor is the estimated coefficient
for moving from the the second to the third quartile of the income distribu-
tion. To test whether income is a significant variable, I test the joint hy-
pothesis H0 : α1 = α2 = α3 = 0, against the alternative hypothesis H1 :
At least one of the coefficients are non-zero. I reject the null hypothesis at α =
0.05 and conclude that at least one of the coefficients are non-zero.46
The estimated result is a puzzle. One would expect the decision to retire
without claiming pension benefits to be a strategic decision aimed at maximizing
the expected stream of pension benefits. Empirical evidence suggests on the other
hand that the RMW of delaying pension take-up is not significant with regard to
the probability of making this decision. In addition, empirical evidence suggests
that individuals in the upper quartile are more prone to retire without claiming
pension benefits. If individuals belonging to the upper quartile of the income
distribution in 2010 have had relatively high earnings throughout their working
career, these individuals also have a higher than average pension wealth. This
means that in terms of pension benefits forfeited, these individuals pay a higher
price for delaying pension take-up than individuals with a lower pension wealth.
The probability model is estimated on a sample of individuals who choose
between four different combinations of claiming and retirement. The retirement
decision and the decision to claim pension benefits may, however, be simultaneous
decisions. Some of the regressors may influence both the retirement decision and
the take-up decision, and produce effects that work in opposite directions and
cancel out. The estimated result should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Regression Results Using a Restricted Sample
In the second regression the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if an individual did not claim pension benefits. This model is estimated
using a subsample of the 8 458 observations, namely the individuals who were
born in 1949, eligible for early pension take-up in 2011, employed in the private
sector and who retired in 2011 (N = 2 336). The regression results are reported
in Appendix D.
When estimating this linear probability model, it is tempting to interpret
the left hand side as the probability of not claiming benefits, given that an
individual has retired. For the vast majority, however, the take-up decision and
46See Appendix C for calculations.
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the retirement decision coincide.47 An individual who would like to retire and
not claim benefits may be liquidity constrained, and therefore choose not to
retire. Since the decision to retire and decision to claim pension benefits may be
simultaneous decisions, the estimated results must be interpreted with caution.
Note, however, that Coile et al. (2002) and Hurd et al. (2004) use this approach
to study delays in the claiming of Social Security benefits.
The reported p-value of the model’s overall significance is 0.0000, so we reject
the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero with very high confidence. In the
estimated model there are three significant coefficients: the coefficients for the
upper quartile of income, the upper quartile of wealth and the RMW of delaying.
Partner’s income is not significant at any relevant level of significance.
The dummy variable indicating whether an individual is in the upper quartile
of the wealth distribution is significant at α = 0.05. The estimated coefficient is
0.0638, meaning that as an individual moves from the third to the upper quar-
tile of the wealth distribution, the probability of not claiming pension benefits
increases by 6.4 percentage points. The regressor is the individual’s registered
wealth. Often, however, the wealth registered on the members of the couple is
the same. Wealth is also highly correlated with own labour income and partner’s
labour income.
The RMW of delaying is significant at α = 0.001. The estimated coefficient is
2.001, meaning that if the RMW of delaying increases by, say 0.01, the probability
of not claiming increases by 2 percentage points. If individuals are concerned with
maximizing expected lifetime income, this is precisely what we would expect.
Given that the RMW varies from 0.91 to 1.15 in the sample, this effect is rather
strong.
The dummy variable indicating whether an individual is in the upper quartile
of the income distribution is significant at α = 0.001. The estimated coefficient is
0.130, meaning that as an individual moves from the third to the upper quartile of
the income distribution, the probability of not claiming pension benefits increases
by 13 percentage points.
Some Remarks
In the first regression I estimate a linear probability model where the dependent
variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual retired without
claiming pension benefits. I estimate the model, using observations on a sample
47See table 3.
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of 8 458 individuals who were born in 1949, eligible for early pension take-up in
2011, employed in the private sector and member of a couple. I find that the
only significant variable is the dummy variable indicating whether an individual
is in the upper quartile of the income distribution, and that moving from the
third to the upper quartile of the income distribution increases the probability of
retiring without claiming pension benefits by 3.7 percentage points. In particular,
partner’s income and the RMW of delaying pension take-up are not significant.
These results suggest that individuals who are relatively rich are more prone
to retire without claiming pension benefits, while this decision appears to be
unaffected by partner’s income and the RMW of delaying pension take-up.
In the second regression I estimate another linear probability model using a
subsample of the observations, namely the individuals who did retire in 2011.
Three coefficients are significant: the dummy variable indicating whether an in-
dividual is in the upper quartile of the income distribution, the dummy variable
indicating whether an individual is in the upper quartile of the wealth distribu-
tion and the RMW of delaying pension take-up. The estimated result indicates
that individuals who are relatively rich are more prone to delay claiming, and
this effect is now stronger than in the first regression: as an individual moves
from the third to the upper quartile of the income distribution, the probability
of delaying pension take-up increases by 13 percentage points. Moving from the
third to the upper quartile of the wealth distribution, the probability of delaying
pension take-up increases by 6.4 percentage points. The RMW of delaying pen-
sion take-up is now significant, and as RMW increases the probability of delaying
pension take-up increases. This is what we expect if individuals are concerned
with maximizing lifetime benefits.
In both the estimated models own income is important. The RMW of de-
laying pension take-up is, however, not significant in the first model, while it is
significant in the second model. Two possible explanations of differences in the
significance of the RMW are the following: first, it is possible that the subsample
of retired individuals are self-selected; and secondly, it is possible that some of
the explanatory variables in the larger sample produce opposing effects on the
retirement decision and the take-up decision.
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5.3 Both Members of the Couple from the 1949-cohort
The second approach is to study couples where both members were born in 1949
and eligible for early pension take-up in 2011 (N = 404). Since the number of
such couples is relatively small, I will only investigate the take-up decision.48
Let CW be a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the wife claimed pension
benefits, and 0 otherwise, and let CH be a dummy variable taking the value 1
if the husband claimed pension benefits and 0 otherwise.49 The couples faced
four possibilities with regard to the pension take-up in 2011: both claiming
pension benefits (CW = 1 ∩ CH = 1), none of them claiming pension benefits
(CW = 0 ∩ CH = 0), the wife not claiming pension benefits while the husband
claimed (CW = 0 ∩ CH = 1), and the wife claiming pension benefits while the
husband did not claim (CW = 1 ∩ CH = 0). Table 6 provides a description of
the couples’ pension take-up decisions, while table 7 provides some descriptive
statistics.
Table 6: Pension take-up in 2011 by couples where both members were born in
1949
Wife claimed Wife did not claim Total
(CW = 1) (CW = 0)
Husband claimed (CH = 1) 41 66 107
Husband did not claim (CH = 0) 28 269 297
Total 69 335 404
In this section I estimate five linear probability models. In the first regression
the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the wife
claimed benefits while the husband did not. I estimate this model using obser-
vations on all couples where only one of the member claimed pension benefits
(N = 94), and using the difference in the relative money’s worth of delaying pen-
sion take-up from age 62 to 67 for the wife and the husband as the sole regressor.
If the couple is concerned with maximizing lifetime income, we expect that an
increase in this difference reduces the probability of the wife claiming and the
husband not claiming.
A dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the wife claimed benefits while
48It is not feasible to evaluate retirement for both partners in these couples. In order to
evaluate retirement we would have to exclude self-employed and employees in the public sector,
which would leave us with 58 couples only.
49The 404 couples are indeed heterosexual couples. I use, for simplicity, ”wife” and ”hus-
band” although the couples consist of cohabiting couples as well.
65
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of the members of of 404 couples in which both
members were born in 1949 and eligible for pension take-up in 2011.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Expected longevity (H) 404 86.202 1.2438 80.598 88.733
Expected longevity (W) 404 89.733 1.2813 85.407 92.287
Husband’s RMW 404 1.0362 0.0132 0.9706 1.0626
Wife’s RMW 404 1.0772 0.0123 1.0392 1.1547
Difference in RMW 404 -0.0409 0.0163 -0.1202 0.0072
Variable (2010) Obs. Median Std. Dev.
Husband’s labour income 404 594 184 412.698
Wife’s labour income 404 476 312 190 227
Wealth 404 651 633 1 708 781
the husband did not is the dependent variable in the second regression as well.
In this regression, however, I use the relative money’s worth of delaying pension
take-up for the wife and the husband as two distinct explanatory variables, and
I estimate the model using observations on all the couples (N = 404). In the
third regression the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1
if the husband claimed benefits while the wife did not. This model is estimated
in the same way as the second regression.
At last I estimate two linear probability models to investigate whether empiri-
cal evidence suggests that the individuals in this sample respond to the incentives
in the pension scheme. The findings of Brinch et al. (2013) suggests that the
Norwegian pension scheme is plagued by adverse selection. I run these regres-
sions to investigate whether the individuals in this sample behave according to
these findings. The regression results are reported in Appendix E.
The Difference in RMWs as Regressor
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the wife claimed
benefits while the husband did not. I use observations on all couples where only
one member claimed his or her pension benefits (N = 94). If a couple uses
available information and cooperate on economic decisions, we expect that the
member whose relative money’s worth of delaying the pension take-up is higher,
delays the take-up.
Let RMW(W ) and RMW(H) denote the relative money’s worth of delaying
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the pension take-up from age 62 to 67 for the wife and the husband respectively.
If RMW(DIFF ) = RWM(W )−RMW(H) > 0, maximization of household lifetime
income suggest that the husband claims early while the wife delays. IfRWM(W )−
RMW(H) < 0, financial maximization suggests that the wife claims early while
the husband delays.
The estimated regression equation is:
Pˆi(CW = 1 ∩ CH = 0) = 0.409− 2.613 ·RMW(DIFF )i (26)
where Pˆi(CW = 1 ∩ CH = 0) is the estimated probability that the wife claimed
pension benefits while the husband did not claim. The sign of the coefficient is
negative, meaning that when the difference in RMW between delaying the wife’s
pension take-up and the husband’s take-up increases, the probability of the wife
claiming and not the husband is reduced. The estimated coefficient is -2.613,
meaning that when RMW(DIFF )i increases by, say, 0.01, Pˆi(CW = 1∩CH = 0) is
reduced by 2.6 percentage points. This is in line with what we would expect in
the case of economic cooperation: if only one member claims pension benefits, it
is the member whose RMW of delaying is the highest who delays the take-up.
The coefficient is, however, not significant. The reported p-value is 0.416, so
we do not reject the null-hypothesis that the coefficient is zero at any relevant
level of significance. We conclude that the difference in the RMWs of delaying
pension take-up for the wife and the husband is not a significant explanatory
variable. The high p-value may be influenced by the low number of observations.
In any case, we are unable to conclude that the difference in RMW has any
explanatory power.
The RMWs as Distinct Regressors
The dependent variable in the second model is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if the wife claimed benefits while the husband did not. In the third
regression the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the
husband claimed benefits while the wife did not I use the RMW of delaying the
pension take-up for the wife and the husband as two distinct regressors, and I
estimate the models using the whole sample (N = 404).
Let P (CW = 1∩CH = 0) denote the probability that the wife claimed pension
benefits while the husband did not claim. Similarly, let P (CW = 0 ∩ CH = 1)
denote the probability that the wife did not claim benefits while the husband
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claimed. If the couple is concerned with maximizing lifetime income, we expect
that P (CW = 1 ∩ CH = 0) depends negatively on RMWW and positively on
RMWH . Conversely we expect that P (CW = 0∩CW = 1) depends positively on
RMWW and negatively on RMWH .
The Probability of Wife Claiming and Husband not Claiming
The estimated probability of the wife claiming and the husband not claiming is:
Pˆi(CW = 1 ∩ CH = 0) = 2.157− 1.127 ·RMW(W )i − 0.843 ·RMW(H)i (27)
While the coefficient of RMWW has the expected sign, the coefficient of RMWH
has the opposite sign of what we would expect. None of the coefficients are,
however, significant at any relevant level. In addition, the p-value of the model’s
overall significance is 0.3142, meaning that we would not reject the null hypoth-
esis that all coefficients are zero at any relevant level of significance.
The Probability of Husband Claiming and Wife not Claiming
The estimated probability of the husband claiming while the wife did not is:
Pˆi(CW = 0 ∩ CH = 1) = 4.255− 0.572 ·RMW(W )i − 3.355 ·RMW(H)i (28)
While the coefficient of RMWH has the expected sign, the coefficient of RMWW
has the opposite sign of what we would expect. RMWH is significant, and the
reported p-value of the estimated coefficient is 0.018. RMWW is not significant.
The p-value of the model’s overall significance is 0.0433, so we reject the null
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero at α = 0.05.
Disregarding the Partner’s Take-Up Decision
The empirical evidence presented does not suggest that Norwegian couples coor-
dinate on claiming pension benefits. A possible explanation is that the couples
do not cooperate, like for example the non-cooperative model predicts. A second
possible explanation is that the individuals do not understand the incentives in
the pension scheme.
The findings of Brinch et al. (2013) suggests that the Norwegian pension
scheme is plagued by adverse selection, and that the individuals respond to the
incentives built into the pension scheme. I run two regressions on the sample I
have studied (N = 404), to investigate if the individuals behave in accordance
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with the findings of Brinch et al. (2013).
The Probability of the Wife Claiming Benefits
First I investigate whether the women in the sample respond to the incentives in
the pension scheme. I estimate the probability of a wife claiming pension bene-
fits, regardless of what her husband did, using observations on the sample of 404
couples where both members were born in 1949 and eligible for early pension
take-up in 2011. To be able to compare the results with the regressions in the
previous section, I use the RMW of delaying pension take-up of both members
as regressors. The estimated result is the following:
Pˆi(CW = 1) = 7.856− 5.433 ·RMWW (i) − 1.768 ·RMWH(i) (29)
The p-value associated with the model’s overall significance is 0.0003, so we reject
the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero with high confidence. RMW(W )
is significant at α = 0.001, and the estimated coefficient has the expected sign.
An increase in the RMW of delaying the wife’s pension take-up of, say 0.01,
reduces the probability that the wife claimed benefits by 5.4 percentage points.
This is in accordance with the findings of Brinch et al. (2013). RMW(H) is not
significant at any relevant level.
The Probability of the Husband Claiming Benefits
I investigate whether the men in the sample respond to the incentives in the pen-
sion scheme. I estimate the probability of the husband claiming pension benefits,
regardless of what his wife did. The estimated result is the following:
Pˆi(CH = 1) = 9.954− 4.877 ·RMW(W )i − 4.280 ·RMW(H)i (30)
The p-value associated with the model’s overall significance is 0.0002, so we reject
the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero with high confidence. RMW(H)
is significant at α = 0.05, and the estimated coefficient has the expected sign. An
increase in the RMW of delaying the husband’s pension take-up of, say 0.01, re-
duces the probability that the husband claimed benefits by 4.3 percentage points.
This is in accordance with the findings of Brinch et al. (2013). A puzzling result
is, however, that RMW(W ) is significant as well. An increase in the RMW of
delaying the wife’s pension take-up of, say 0.01, reduces the probability that the
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husband claimed benefits by 4.8 percentage points. The coefficient is significant
at a α = 0.01. This rather puzzling result will be further discussed below.
Some Remarks
The probability of the wife claiming pension benefits is the sum of the following:
P (CW = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(29)
= P (CW = 1 ∩ CH = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+P (CW = 1 ∩ CH = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(27)
(31)
In the regression where I estimated the probability that the wife claimed benefits
while the husband did not claim benefits (27), none of the coefficients were
significant at any relevant level and we would not reject the joint hypothesis the
all coefficients are zero. We know, however, that the RMW of the wife’s take-
up is a significant determinant of the probability of the wife claiming pension
benefits. This means that the RMW of delaying the wife’s pension take-up is
an important determinant of the probability of both members claiming benefits.
Similarly, since the RMW of delaying husband’s take-up is not significant with
regard to the probability of the wife claiming pension benefits, we conclude that
the RMW of delaying husband’s take-up is not significant with regard to the
probability of both members claiming pension benefits.
Similarly, the probability of the husband claiming pension benefits is given
by:
P (CH = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(30)
= P (CW = 1 ∩ CH = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+P (CW = 0 ∩ CH = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(28)
(32)
We know that both the RMW of delaying the wife’s take-up and the RMW of de-
laying the husband’s take-up are determinants of the probability of the husband
claiming benefits. I argued above that the RMW of delaying the wife’s pension
take-up is an important determinant of the probability that both members claim
pension benefits. The effect of the RMW of delaying the wife’s take-up on the
probability of the husband claiming benefits, is thus captured by the probability
that both members claim their benefits (B). I also argued that the RMW of de-
laying husband’s take-up was not significant with regard to the probability that
both members claim their benefits. This means that the effect of the RMW of
delaying husband’s take-up on the probability that the husband claimed benefits,
is captured entirely by the probability that the husband claimed benefits while
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the wife did not claim benefits (28).
Summarizing the Results of this Section
The results in this section can be summarized as follows:
• The difference in relative money’s worth between delaying the wife’s take-
up and the husband’s take-up is not a significant determinant of the prob-
ability that the wife claimed pension benefits, while the husband did not
• The RMW of delaying the wife’s take-up is an important determinant of
the probability that the wife delayed pension take-up. In particular, this
variable affects the probability of the wife claiming benefits through the
probability that both members claimed their pension benefits.
• The RMW of delaying the husband’s take-up is an important determinant
of the probability that the husband delayed pension take-up. In particu-
lar, this variable affects the probability of the husband claiming benefits
through the probability that the husband claimed while the wife did not
claim pension benefits.
There is no intuitive explanation of why the RMW of delaying the wife’s pension
take-up is an important determinant of the probability of both members claiming
benefits, while the RMW of delaying the husband’s take up is insignificant with
respect to this probability. Since the sample is relatively small, this result may
be a coincidence. Another possible explanation is that there are peer effects,
i.e., that the members of the couple simply do the same thing. It should be
emphasized that this section does not consider the retirement decision. Since
the take-up decision and the retirement decision may be simultaneous decisions,
there may be effects at work which this analysis does not capture.
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5.4 Some Concluding Remarks
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests the following conclu-
sions about Norwegian couples and their pension take-up:
• Own income is an important determinant when deciding to retire without
claiming pension benefits. In particular, as an individual moves from the
third to the upper quartile of the income distribution in the sample, the
probability of retiring without claiming pension benefits increases with 3.7
percentage points.
• Partner’s income does not affect the decision to retire without claiming
pension benefits.
• For couples in which both members were born in 1949 and eligible for early
pension take-up and in which only one of the members claimed pension
benefits, the difference in the RMWs between delaying the wife’s take-up
and the husband’s take-up is not a significant determinant of the probability
that the wife claimed pension benefits, while the husband did not.
• Empirical evidence indicates that the individuals in the sample understand
the incentive structure in the pension scheme and that individuals take
their expected longevity into account when deciding whether or not to
claim pension benefits. These findings are in accordance with the findings
of Brinch et al. (2013): individuals with higher than average expected
longevity are more prone to delay pension take-up than individuals with
lower expected longevity
The economic models of household behaviour makes different predictions with
regard to couples’ pension take-up. In particular, the unitary model and the
collective model predict that the couple will coordinate on the claiming of pension
benefits. These predictions are not confirmed by the empirical findings.
The predictions of the cooperative bargaining model is less clear, as maxi-
mization of household income produces two opposing effects. Maximization of
household income makes the pool to be divided bigger, which is an argument
in favour of cooperation. The increased stream of future pension benefits may,
however, alter the bargaining power.
The empirical findings appear to be in accordance with the non-cooperative
model. According to the non-cooperative model, the couples will as a general rule
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not cooperate on their pension take-up.50 An objection could be that couples
do not understand the incentives in the pension scheme. However, empirical
evidence suggests that the individuals understand the incentives very well. In
particular, expected longevity is a significant determinant of individuals’ pension
take-up decisions, suggesting that individuals are concerned with maximizing
their own income.
It should be emphasized that both empirical strategies have potential weak-
nesses. In the first section I estimate two linear probability models. In the first
regression I estimate the probability of retiring without claiming pension benefits.
The disadvantage of this analysis, is that the individuals face four different com-
binations of retirement and take-up. Since the decision to retire and the decision
to claim pension benefits may be simultaneous decisions, opposing effects may
be at work. In the second regression I exclude the non-retired individuals, and
estimate the probability of not claiming. Since the retirement decision and the
take-up decision may be simultaneous decisions, the problem with this approach
is that the sample may be self-selected. It should also be emphasized that by
evaluating retirement in terms of reduced income, it is possible that individuals
who retired partially are defined as retired.
In the second section I investigate the take-up of pension benefits by couples
where both members were born in 1949 and eligible for pension take-up in 2011.
The sample is a rather small, and the retirement decision is disregarded. Since
the retirement decision and the take-up decision may be simultaneous decisions
there may be effects at work which this analysis does not capture.
50In chapter 4 I argued that there are some cases in which the prediction of the non-
cooperative model is that being in a couple may facilitate delaying pension take-up. For
this to be the case, the partner’s income must be sufficiently high, and both persons must
sufficiently favour the pubic goods.
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6 Conclusion
This thesis has investigated whether empirical evidence suggests that Norwe-
gian couples coordinate on claiming pension benefits. The empirical evidence
presented in this thesis suggests that they do not.
A key feature of the new Norwegian pension scheme is flexible retirement for
the age group 62 - 75 years, implying that the decision to retire from the labour
force and the decision to claim pension benefits are decoupled. An individual
who is eligible to claim pension benefits when she turns 62 may claim benefits
right away or delay claiming by, say, a year. The delay of claiming will increase
her annual pension benefits for the rest of her life, but pension benefits this year
are forfeited. The Norwegian pension scheme is actuarial neutral on average,
meaning that, for a given pension wealth, the expected discounted value of future
benefits is the same regardless of the timing of pension take-up for agents with
average expected longevity. For agents whose life expectancy differs from the
average, on the other hand, the expected discounted value of future pension
benefits depends on the timing of the pension take-up. These features of the
new Norwegian pension scheme were discussed in chapter 2.
Delaying the take-up of pension benefits implies that pension benefits this
year are forfeited, but annual pension benefits will be higher for the rest of an
agent’s life. This means that delaying pension take-up is equivalent to buying an
annuity, treating the pension benefits forfeited as the price of the annuity. The
take-up decision can therefore be studied in the theoretical framework normally
used to study demand for annuities. In chapter 3 I discussed some determinants
of annuity demand, including the money’s worth, risk aversion, pre-annuitized
wealth, credit market and liquidity constraints, the subjective discount factor,
marital status and bequest motives. I argued that the money’s worth of the
annuity and risk aversion, in particular, are important determinants of annu-
ity demand. The money’s worth of an annuity is increasing in the expected
longevity, meaning that annuities are worth more to individuals who expect to
live longer. The markets for annuities - including the new Norwegian pension
scheme - are therefore potentially exposed to problems of adverse selection. An
annuity provides insurance against the risk of outliving one’s resources. This
means that more risk aversion leads to a higher valuation of the annuity. This
second factor may be less important in the context of the Norwegian pension
scheme since all members of the National Insurance Scheme are guaranteed a
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minimum pension and therefore partially isolated against the risk of outliving
their resources.
When the new pension scheme was implemented in 2011, all four combina-
tions of retirement and claiming turned out to be rather common. Brinch et al.
(2013) find some positive correlation between retirement and the claiming of old
age pensions, but the relationship is far from perfect. In particular, the authors
find that claiming is strongly associated with predictors of expected longevity,
suggesting that there is substantial adverse selection with regard to the claiming
of pension benefits in the new Norwegian pension scheme.
With regard to the four different combinations of retirement and claiming,
retiring without claiming pension benefits may not be feasible for some agents due
to liquidity constraints. Being in a couple may facilitate delaying take-up while
retired if the agent can rely on his or her partner’s income. Economic models
of the household differ, however, in the predictions of economic cooperation and
household money management. In chapter 4, four different models of household
behaviour were presented as well as their predictions with regard to cooperation
on pension take-up. According to the unitary model the household will indeed
cooperate to maximize expected household income. This models rests on the
assumption that the household maximizes a household utility function subject to
the household budget constraint. The prediction of the collective model was the
same. The underlying assumptions in the collective model differ, however, from
the assumptions in the unitary model. In the collective model the individuals
have distinct preferences but will reach a Pareto-efficient agreement since they
can make binding and enforceable contracts. According to the non-cooperative
model being in a couple will only by exception facilitate delaying pension take-up
if an agent is liquidity-constrained. The predictions of the cooperative bargaining
model that was introduced were less clear.
The starting point for the empirical investigation of couples’ take-up decisions
were all Norwegian citizens born in 1949, members of a couple and eligible for
early pension take-up in 2011. For these individuals I have data on annual
incomes (2010 and 2011), wealth (2010), partner’s income (2010) and pension
take-up. I also have data on what Brinch et al. (2013) call the relative money’s
worth (RMW) of delaying pension take-up from age 62 to 67. In their study of
adverse selection in the Norwegian pension scheme, Brinch et al. (2013) estimate
a mortality model and simulate the life span of each individual in the 1949-cohort.
The authors use the expected longevity to calculate the RMW of delaying pension
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take-up for each individual who was eligible for early pension take-up in 2011.
The RMW is defined as the lifetime expected benefits conditional on claiming at
age 67 in terms of expected benefits conditional on claiming at age 62.
The first empirical strategy was to investigate the decision to retire without
claiming pension benefits. First, I estimated a linear probability model where the
dependent variable was a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual re-
tired without claiming pension benefits. I used own income and wealth, partner’s
income and the RMW of delaying pension take-up as regressors. The only signif-
icant regressor was a dummy variable indicating whether the individual was in
the upper quartile of the income distribution in the sample. Importantly, wealth,
partner’s income and the RMW of delaying pension take-up were not significant.
In the second step, I excluded individuals who did not retire from the sample,
and used the same regressors to estimate the probability of not claiming pension
benefits. Three regressors were significant: a dummy variable indicating whether
the individual was in the upper quartile of the income distribution, a dummy
variable indicating whether the individual was in the upper quartile of the wealth
distribution and the RMW of delaying pension take-up. Partner’s income was
not significant. It is tempting to interpret the estimated result as the probability
of not claiming benefits given that an individual has retired. Since the decision to
retire and the decision to claim pension benefits may be simultaneous decisions,
the estimated result should, however, be interpreted with caution.
The second empirical strategy was to investigate couples where both members
of the couple were born in 1949 and eligible for early pension take-up in 2011.
First, I estimated the probability that the wife claimed while the husband did
not claim benefits, using data on couples in which only one member claimed
benefits. The sole regressor was the difference in RMW, and this regressor was
not significant. Thereafter I estimated the probability of the wife claiming while
the husband did not claim, using the RMW of delaying the take-up of both
the wife and the husband as distinct regressors. None of the regressors were
significant, and we would not reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients were
zero. Similarly, I estimated the probability of husband claiming while the wife
did not claim, using the RMW of delaying the take-up of both the wife and
the husband as distinct regressors. In this regresson the RMW of delaying the
husband’s take-up was significant.
At last, I investigated whether empirical evidence suggests that individuals
in the sample understand the incentives in the pension scheme. I estimated the
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probability of the wife claiming benefits, disregarding the husband’s decision. I
used the RMW of delaying the take-up of both the wife and the husband as
distinct regressors, and found that only the RMW of delaying the wife’s take-
up was significant. I ran a similar regression estimating the probability of the
husband claiming pension benefits, regardless of what his wife did, and found that
both regressors were significant. The findings suggest that claiming is strongly
associated with the RMW of delaying pension take-up, and are thus in accordance
with the findings of Brinch et al. (2013).
None of the empirical findings presented suggest that Norwegian couples co-
ordinate on claiming pension benefits. Empirical evidence suggests, however,
that the individuals understand and respond to the incentives in the pension
scheme. Lack of cooperation should therefore not be interpreted as a lack of
understanding of the incentive structure. These findings are in accordance with
the predictions of the non-cooperative model. The findings may also be in ac-
cordance with the cooperative bargaining model, suggesting for example that it
is important to control own income.
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Appendices
A Mathematical Calculations
Solving the non-cooperative model
Person a solves the following maximization problem:
L = α ln(qa) + (1− α) ln(Qa +Qb)− λ(pqa + PQa − Y a) (33)
The choice-variables are qa and Qa, and the first-order conditions are:
α
qa
− λp = 0 (34)
1− α
Qa +Qb
− λP = 0 (35)
Combining the two first-order conditions we get an expression that we can solve
for qa:
α
qap
=
1− α
P (Qa +Qb)
⇔ qap(1− α) = αP (Qa +Qb)
⇔ qa = αP (Q
a +Qb)
p(1− α) (36)
By inserting (36) in person a’s budget constraint, p · qa + P · Qa = Y a, we find
a’s demand for the public good:
p ·
(
αP (Qa +Qb)
p(1− α)
)
+ P ·Qa = Y a
⇔ αP (Qa +Qb) + (1− α)(P ·Qa) = Y a(1− α)
⇔ αPQb + PQa = (1− α)Y a
⇔ Qa = (1− α)Y
a
P
− αQb (37)
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We note that,
∂Qa
∂α
= −Y
a
P
−Qb < 0
∂Qa
∂Y a
=
1− α
P
> 0
∂Qa
∂P
= −(1− α)Y
a
P 2
< 0
∂Qa
∂Qb
= −α < 0 (38)
Person a’s demand for the public good increases with income and decreases
with the price of the public good. Furthermore, it decreases with person b’s
contribution to the public good and with the parameter α, measuring the relative
weight person a puts on the private good.
Similarly, person b solves the following maximization problem:
L = β ln(qb) + (1− β) ln(Qa +Qb)− λ(pqb + PQb − Y b) (39)
This program is solved precisely in the same manner as the program for person
a. Person b’s demand for the public good satisfies the same properties as person
a’s demand:
Qb =
(1− β)Y b
P
− βQa (40)
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B Retiring Without Claiming Pension Benefits
Table 8 reports the regression results from Stata when I estimated the probability
of retiring and not claiming, using data on 8 458 individuals.
Table 8: The probability of retiring without claiming pension benefits
(1)
retired and notclaiming
labour income 2 -0.00614
(0.00906)
labour income 3 -0.0104
(0.00905)
labour income 4 0.0371∗∗∗
(0.00909)
wealth 2 0.00828
(0.00905)
wealth 3 0.00202
(0.00909)
wealth 4 0.0165
(0.00916)
partner labour income 2 0.00144
(0.00905)
partner labour income 3 0.000248
(0.00905)
partner labour income 4 -0.00390
(0.00931)
rmw -0.00859
(0.164)
N 8458
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C F-test
To test whether income is a significant variable, I test the joint hypothesis:
H0 : α1 = α2 = α3 = 0
against the alternative hypothesis:
H1 : At least one of the coefficients are non-zero.
When the null-hypothesis is true, income drop out as an explanatory variable.
The F-test for the hypothesis H0 : α1 = α2 = α3 = 0 is based on a comparison of
the sums of squared errors from the unrestricted model in (25) and the restricted
model where income is dropped as explanatory variable.
The test-statistic is:
F =
SSER−SSEU
J
SSEU
N−K
where SSER is the sum of squared errors in the restricted model, SSEU is the
sum of squared errors in the unrestricted model, J = the number of restrictions in
the null-hypothesis, N = is the number of observations, and K = is the number
of coefficients in the unrestricted model. If H0 is true, then the F -statistic follows
an F-distribution with (J , N −K) degrees of freedom.
Since J = 3, N = 8458 and K = 11, the F-statistic follows a F(3, 8447)-
distribution when the null hypothesis is true. Using α = 0.05, the critical value
from the F(3, 8447)-distribution is FC = 2.605. We reject H0 if F ≥ 2.605.51
The observed F -statistic is
F(OBS) =
729.6−728.6
3
728.6
8458−11
≈ 3.864 ≥ FC
We therefore reject the null-hypothesis that all coefficients are zero, and conclude
that at least one of the coefficients are non-zero.
51If the null hypothesis is not true, then the difference between SSER and SSEU becomes
large, implying that the restrictions placed on the model by the null hypothesis significantly
reduces the ability of the model to fit the data.
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D Regression on a restricted sample
Table 9 reports the regression results from Stata when I estimated the probability
of delaying the take-up of benefits, using data on a subsample of 2 336 individuals.
Table 9: The probability of not claiming benefits, using data on individuals in
the sample who did retire in 2011.
(1)
retired and notclaiming
labour income 2 0.0179
(0.0304)
labour income 3 -0.00718
(0.0324)
labour income 4 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0326)
wealth 2 0.0401
(0.0312)
wealth 3 -0.00117
(0.0314)
wealth 4 0.0638∗
(0.0321)
partner labour income 2 0.0233
(0.0306)
partner labour income 3 0.0188
(0.0310)
partner labour income 4 -0.00158
(0.0333)
rmw 2.001∗∗∗
(0.595)
cons -1.762∗∗
(0.613)
N 1936
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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E Both Members of the Couple from the 1949-
cohort
Table 10: The probability that the wife claimed while the husband did not claim,
using difference in RMWs as regressor.
(1)
wife claim husband not
diff RMW -2.613
(3.197)
cons 0.409∗∗
(0.144)
N 94
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 11: The probability that the wife claimed while the husband did not claim,
using the RMWs as distinct regressors.
(1)
wife claim husband not
RMW W -1.127
(0.998)
RMW H -0.843
(0.843)
cons 2.157
(1.378)
N 404
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: The probability that the husband claimed while the wife did not claim,
using the RMWs as distinct regressors.
(1)
husband claim wife not
RMW W -0.572
(1.403)
RMW H -3.355∗
(1.403)
cons 4.255∗
(1.984)
N 404
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 13: The probability that the wife claimed, regardless of what her husband
did, using the RMWs as distinct regressors.
(1)
wife claim
RMW H -1.768
(1.419)
RMW W -5.433∗∗∗
(1.526)
cons 7.856∗∗∗
(1.996)
N 404
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 14: Husband claim regardless of wife. RMW of both as regressor
(1)
husband claim
RMW H -4.280∗
(1.662)
RMW W -4.877∗∗
(1.788)
cons 9.954∗∗∗
(2.338)
N 404
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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